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Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language monthly journal VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL.

CONTENTS

Maj Gen Khrobostov Praises Proletarian Internationalism (pp 3-9) (V. P. Khrobostov)	1
SOVIET MILITARY ART	
On the Question of Strategic Operations in the Great Patriotic War (pp 10-23) (V. V. Gurkin, M. I. Golovnin)	10
Achieving Surprise From the Experience of the Great Patriotic War (pp 24-30) (P. T. Kunitskiy)	25
Torpedo Boat Operations to Disrupt Enemy Sea Movements (pp 31-36) (A. N. Zamchalov)	34
From the Experience of the Soviet Army Rear Staff in World War II (pp 37-44) (I. M. Golushko)	41
PARTY POLITICAL WORK	
Certain Particular Features in Party Political Work in Mobile Groups of Fronts and Armies (pp 45-51) (L. G. Kumin, V. M. Maltsev) (not translated)	
Col Gen Utkin Examines Frunze's Ideas on Leading Role of Party (pp 52-57) (B. P. Utkin)	50
ON THE ESTABLISHING OF ARMIES IN THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES	
Soviet International Aid in Founding, Developing Socialist Armies (pp 58-62) (A. M. Mayorov)	57

MEMOIRS AND ESSAYS

SCIENTIFIC REPORTS AND INFORMATION

From the History of the Birth and Development of Rocket Weapons (pp 70-75)
(B. A. Kaplunov, V. K. Mashlyakovskiy) (not translated)

Rear Support of 14th Army in Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation (pp 82-87)
(V. V. Ovsvannikov, V. V. Shmidt) 82

Combat of VChK Troops on Civil War Fronts (pp 88-89)
(A. I. Aleksentsev) (not translated)

MILITARY HISTORY DATES

Richard Sorge (pp 90-92)
(A. Yegorov) (not translated)

CURRENT EVENTS, FACTS, FINDINGS (p 93)
(Unattributed) (not translated)

CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

From the History of the All-Army Political Worker Conferences (pp 94-95)
(V. P. Bokarev) (not translated)

The Air Lifeline Over Ladoga (pp 95-96) (V. G. Dayev) (not translated)

MAJ GEN KHROBOSTOV PRAISES PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 85 pp 3-9

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Maj Gen V. P. Khrobostov: "V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the Role of Internationalism in Defense of the Socialist Fatherland"]

[Text] Vladimir Ilich Lenin has pointed out that the strengthening of the Red Army determines the tenacity of the Soviet republic in the fight against imperialists. The leader of the proletariat demanded that the personnel of the Army and Navy be indoctrinated in a spirit of proletarian internationalism and a constant readiness not only to defend one's socialist fatherland but also provide aid to the other peoples who have set out to fight imperialism for their national liberation.

The Communist Party headed by V. I. Lenin from the very first days of its existence consistently carried out the principles of proletarian internationalism and this was seen as one of the most important criteria of a true revolution. The Russian proletariat was always an internationalist class, a fighting class for liberty, independence and the bright future of all mankind.

With the victory of socialism, internationalism became socialist internationalism. It encompassed all spheres of activity, it expressed the commonness of class interests and goals among the peoples of fraternal states and was manifested in their broad collaboration, mutual aid and support of all the revolutionary forces of the modern world in the struggle against imperialism. At present, socialism acts as a powerful world system which has an enormous influence on the development of mankind and its future and is an insurmountable factor of peace and the guarantor of the security of peoples.

The complex international situation demands from the peoples in the socialist countries high political vigilance and greater defense might. V. I. Lenin cautioned that the imperialist bourgeoisie would endeavor to defeat the victorious proletariat of the socialist states and restore capitalism. Here the imperialists would not restrict themselves to the use of just economic, political and ideological means for weakening and eliminating the new system, but would endeavor to achieve their aims with the help of arms. This is why the socialist revolution should be able to oppose the well armed class enemy

with invincible military might. Lenin urged the communists and the workers from the numerous nations and nationalities of the Soviet country to forge their military forces into a strong international army. The decree signed by him on the founding of the Red Army proclaimed that service in its ranks was a duty for all Soviet citizens without any restrictions in terms of national affiliation. Thus, legislation reinforced the equality of peoples in the area of military organizational development.

In the form of the Red Army all workers gained a steadfast defender of their class and national interests. The most important feature of the army of the socialist state, the army of the new socialist type, was that it was formed as an army of fraternity and friendship of the Soviet peoples. The glorious history clearly shows that the Red Army has always honorably carried out its patriotic and international duty.

During the years of the Civil War and the struggle against the intervention, fighting courageously along with the Russians in the Red Army were Ukrainians, Belorussians, Latvians, Georgians, Armenians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kirghiz, Estonians and representatives from the other nationalities of our country. By the end of the war, the army consisted of: 77.6 percent Russians, 13.7 Ukrainians, 4.0 Belorussians and 4.7 percent Latvians, Tatars, Bashkirs and representatives of the other nationalities.(1)

Of important significance for the defense of the Soviet republic was the establishing of international military formations in the Red Army. V. I. Lenin warmly welcomed internationalist workers from other countries who helped the workers of the Soviet country in defending the victories of the socialist revolution. On the fronts of the Civil War fighting in the ranks of the Red Army were tens of thousands of such internationalist fighters, including over 80,000 Hungarians, 40,000 Chinese, around 20,000 Yugoslavs, up to 12,000 Czechs and Slovaks, thousands of Bulgarians, Austrians, Germans, Finns, French, Romanians, Koreans, Mongolians and hundreds of Italians, Indians and representatives of other peoples of the world.(2)

Facts convincingly show that the Red Army from the very first days of its existence became an army of proletarian internationalism. The men of the international units made a worthy contribution to the cause of the victory of the nation's workers in the Civil War. From generation to generation the noble names are handed down of the Hungarian patriots B. Kun, T. Szamuelyi, M. Zalki and D. Ferago; V. Atanasov, N. Angelov and I. Nyakshev from Bulgaria; S. Castek, J. Gasek and E. Kuzelo from Czechoslovakia; O. Dundic, G. Barabas and D. Serdich from Yugoslavia; K. Swierczewsky and S. Bobinsky from Poland; A. Kampf from Germany, M. Buzor and M. Gheorghiu from Romania as well as many other internationalists.

In turn, the Soviet republic repeatedly provided effective aid to the international revolutionary forces fighting for social and national liberation, for freedom and democracy. V. I. Lenin taught: "...One must think not only about one's own nation, but rather place the interests of everyone, their universal freedom and equality higher than this."(3) Great October provided the state independence of Poland, Finland and other countries. When, for example, in 1919, a revolution occurred in Hungary and

the Hungarian Soviet republic was proclaimed, an international brigade was organized in Budapest which included a Russian battalion. In 1921, the Red Army participated in the defeat of Japanese invaders in Mongolia as well as the remnants of the White Guard bands which had escaped there. Soviet soldiers along with the soldiers of the Mongolian People's Army in 1939 defeated Japanese aggressors in the area of the Khalkhin-Gol River. Loyal to their international duty, the Soviet Armed Forces helped the Chinese people in all stages of their struggle for freedom and independence. In 1939, the Soviet soldiers carried out a liberation campaign into Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia and in the following year supported workers from the fraternal Baltic republics, preventing the suppression of proletarian revolutions in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. In 1936-1939, our country provided military aid to the Spanish Republic against which intervention was organized by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.

On 22 June 1941, Nazi Germany, having torn up the Non-aggression Pact, treacherously attacked the Soviet Union. Upon the appeal of the Communist Party, all the Soviet people, as a single man, rose to the sacred battle against the accursed enemy. They fought courageously on the front and worked unstintingly in the rear. The party slogan "Everything for the Front, Everything for Victory!" determined the deeds and thoughts of the city and village workers as well as the men of the Army and Navy.

Millions of sons and daughters of the Soviet fatherland were decorated with combat orders for courage and valor shown in the war years. There are the representatives of over 50 USSR nations and nationalities among those who received the highest degree of distinction, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The Great Patriotic War clearly confirmed the correctness of the party's nationality policy in state and military development. The fraternal union of Soviet peoples founded on the unbreakable commonness of their class interests and goals and on Marxist-Leninist ideology convincingly demonstrated its viability.

The outcome of World War II was determined precisely on the Soviet-German Front. Guided by the party of Lenin and relying on the unstinting support of the workers in their country, the Soviet Armed Forces in the battles against Nazism demonstrated the highest military skill, insurmountable spirit and monolithic solidarity. To the entire world they represented an army of the friendship of peoples, a liberator army which wholeheartedly served the just cause of defending socialism and the cause of international security.

The Soviet Union became the main force blocking the path to world domination for German Nazism. It carried on its shoulders the basic burden of the war and played the decisive role in the defeat of Nazi Germany and later militarist Japan. The bourgeois falsifiers of history have not abandoned the attempts to play down the role of our state in the victory in World War II. But facts are a stubborn thing. They show that the Soviet-German Front was the main front. Here were two-thirds of the total number of formations which Nazi Germany then had. The enormous enemy armed forces and primarily their

basic part, the Ground Forces, were ground down in battles on the Eastern Front.

The patriotic forces of a number of European countries during the years of World War II established their own liberation armies which, along with the Soviet Armed Forces, successfully routed the common hated enemy. The USSR provided them great aid in the development of these armies having made available combat equipment, weapons and other supplies for their organization. The first units and formations of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania were established on our territory.

During the years of the struggle against Naziism, two Polish armies, a Czechoslovak army corps, two Romanian infantry divisions, several Yugoslav units and the French Normandy-Neman Air Regiment were organized and supplied with weapons and combat equipment. The total number of these formations at the end of the war reached 550,000 men.(4)

Growing and becoming stronger in battle, the friendly armies took an active part in the engagements of World War II in the European Theater of Operations. Thus, in a number of major operations in the final period of the Great Patriotic War, an active part was taken by the 1st and 2d Polish Armies. Troops from Yugoslavia and Bulgaria participated along with Soviet troops in the Belgrad Operation. Two Romanian armies and one Bulgarian army fought as part of the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts in the liberation of Hungary. The Vienna Offensive Operation was conducted by Soviet troops with the participation of formations from the 1st Bulgarian Army. In the Prague Operation, two Romanian armies, one Polish army, a Czechoslovak army corps and a Hungarian brigade fought shoulder to shoulder with the men of the three Ukrainian fronts.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, the Mongolian People's Republic became a dependable ally of the Soviet nation. The fraternal Mongolian people, loyal to the principles of proletarian internationalism, provided the Soviet Army with a large number of forces, food and warm clothing. The Tank Column "Revolutionary Mongolia" and the Air Squadron "Mongolian Arat" were organized by funds from the workers of this country. In August 1945, the Mongolian People's Army together with the Soviet military routed the Japanese militarists in Manchuria.

Thus, the international fraternity in arms which arose in the first years of Soviet power during the years of World War II underwent further development. Strengthened in joint battles, it successfully withstood testing in the final engagements against the hordes of Nazi Germany and militarist Japan.

World War II ended with the complete defeat of the aggressors and with an outcome unforeseen by the imperialists: a large group of European and Asian states dropped out of the capitalist system. Socialism went beyond the limits of one country and became a world system. This was the second most important event after the Great October Socialist Revolution.

However, historical practice shows that to its defeats in social battles imperialism has responded by a growing reaction in all areas. In endeavoring

at its own discretion and from a position of strength to determine the fates of peoples and set the development of world events, at an unprecedented pace it has prepared for a new, thermonuclear war and has intensely carried out ideological subversion.

In the complex international situation, when imperialism with particular fierceness is resisting social progress, an active, coordinated foreign policy of the socialist states assumes ever-greater significance as reinforced by their high economic and defense potential and by the entire range of measures to defend socialism.

"An insurmountable force in the struggle for the peaceful future of mankind is the close cooperation of the socialist states," as was pointed out at the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "their economic and defense might, and unity of actions on the international scene. An exceptionally important historical victory of the fraternal socialist nations is the achieving of military strategic equilibrium with the states of the aggressive NATO bloc. This parity must be safeguarded at all cost for the sake of peace. It dependably restrains the aggressive appetites of imperialism."(5)

The Communist Party and the Soviet state have been constantly concerned that the USSR Armed Forces had everything necessary for the secure defense of our fatherland and its allies and that no one could catch us by surprise. At present, the Armed Forces are an inseparable part of the great social and international community of people, the Soviet people. The unity of the Soviet peoples, their friendship and fraternity are presently stronger than ever before. For the Soviet people, a feeling of national pride is inseparable from the feeling of belonging to the unified great Soviet motherland, the USSR.

Indoctrination of the men in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism is an important task for the commanders, political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations. This includes, in essence, all aspects of shaping conscious and active fighters for the victory of communism and heroic, dedicated defenders of the Soviet motherland and the nations of the socialist commonwealth.

Propagandizing the superiority of the socialist system over the capitalist one and the successes of the Soviet people in communist construction helps to develop a feeling of patriotism and internationalism in the Soviet military. Diverse forms and methods of ideological work are used for this. On one of the ships during a long cruise, the command, the party and Komsomol activists proposed that the sailors and petty officers during their leisure hours write unique compositions in which they set forward their ideas about the motherland and military duty. The sailors showed an interest in the proposal.

"I am confident there is not and cannot be any true life without the motherland," wrote PO 1st Class V. Vorobyev in his composition, "without the profoundest, all-conquering love for it. The motherland! This is a great, stirring and vast word! When it is pronounced, one certainly has in mind something very special and great. This word can often be heard on the ship during the cruise, when we are very homesick. When I hear it, I for some

reason see my small house on the bank of an unnamed stream, the two white willows by the window, the sheaves of pungent straw on the infinite meadows, I hear the song of the lark and the chirping of grasshoppers. This is me and I will remember it forever. This is a particle of what I have been assigned to protect, like the apple of my eye, and for this I am ready to endure any hardships." Similar thoughts were voiced in other compositions, too. They show the infinite love of the men for their fatherland and a readiness to commit a feat for its sake.

In being guided by the Leninist ideas of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, the Communist Party and the Soviet government have given unflagging attention to instilling in our people and their armed defenders a spirit of unbreakable friendship among the Soviet peoples, a combat alliance with the fraternal socialist countries and their armies and an understanding of international duty to all the world's workers.

The subunits, units and ships have gained great experience in the international indoctrination of the personnel. Work in this area is carried out particularly actively in the Soviet troops temporarily stationed in accord with the bilateral treaties on the territories of the fraternal socialist countries, the GDR, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia as well as in the units of our troops which are in Afghanistan upon the request of the Afghan government. According to the plans of the Joint Command of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces, between the Soviet troops and the fraternal armies, friendly ties are maintained: evenings of combat comradeship, meetings and other measures are held and these serve as good schooling in internationalism. Thus, in one of the units of the Central Group of Forces, many seminars devoted to the questions of international indoctrination of the military are conducted jointly with representatives of the Czechoslovak People's Army. In the course of them they study the theoretical principles of socialist internationalism, they discuss the basic forms of work, they adjust plans and work out recommendations on making visual agitation and using technical propaganda equipment. Joint studies by the Soviet and Czechoslovak comrades are mutually enriched by the experience of indoctrinating the personnel.

Political workers from the units maintained close and fruitful ties with the party leaders of the Czechoslovak cities and oblasts. This provides them with an opportunity to quickly inform the commanders and party activists and through them all the servicemen of the successes of the workers in socialist construction.

Great attention is given to organizing party political work at joint tactical exercises, field firings and in flights. Precisely this strengthens confidence in one another. With good reason, prior to each field exercise, the commanders and political workers from the subunits of the Central Group of Forces and Czechoslovak comrades without fail draw up a common plan of party political work. Similar planning is carried out on all levels: from the company to the political directorate of the group of forces. There is also much that is interesting and instructive in the work in the area of international indoctrination in the units of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

In one of the units, in studying the subject "The World Historical Victory of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War," a visit to the combat glory museum was organized. The Komsomol activists N. Krasilnikov, Yu. Lebedev, Ye. Bodashov and V. Ogorodov acquainted the soldiers and sergeants with the documents on the international mission of the Soviet Army during the years of the Great Patriotic War. During the hours of independent study, the personnel were told about the struggle of the antifascists, and specific examples were given. The men became acquainted with the feat of the German anti-Nazi Fritz Schmenkel who, in fighting in the ranks of the Belorussian partisans, died a death of the brave on Soviet land. By an Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. At present, the name of the courageous patriot has become a symbol of the combat fraternity of the Soviet military and the GDR National People's Army.

In the agitation and propaganda work a major place is given to international questions. The party and Komsomol activists often speak to the personnel giving lectures, reports and talks on the questions "In a Single Battle Formation," "On Guard for Peace and Socialism," "Know and Respect the Laws of the GDR" and "The GDR National People's Army -- An Army of Working People." Here meetings with veterans of the worker movement, with party and state leaders of the GDR and the worker youth have become a tradition.

Many various measures are also carried out in the Northern and Southern Group of Forces. In the garrisons professional ties have been successfully developed with the local party and state bodies, with the friendship societies, enterprises and cooperatives and troop units. It has become a firm part of indoctrinal work to hold meetings of international friendship, exchange experience on the upkeep and operation of combat equipment and weapons, to hold joint communist Saturdays, to lay wreaths on the graves of Soviet soldiers who fell on the territory of the socialist states, to exchange speeches of propagandists, to create films, to hold meetings with veterans of the revolutionary movement as well as sports and mass cultural measures.

There is a noticeable trend toward a more comprehensive carrying out of international indoctrination tasks. This has begun to be more closely linked to combat and political training. During each period of instruction with officers, warrant officers ["praporshchik"], sergeants and soldiers, exercises are held devoted to questions of international indoctrination. In mass political work opportunities are used for lecture propaganda, oral and visual agitation, mass information media and the military press. In the military service of the Soviet soldiers, as in any other socially useful labor in our country, patriotic and international principles are inseparable. Military service contributes to the good of all the Soviet people and all their component nations and nationalities. This is work for the sake of the freedom and independence of the socialist fatherland, work for the sake of communism and peace on earth.

The wholehearted love for their multinational fatherland is combined in the Soviet military with a feeling of solidarity with all peoples fighting for social and national liberation. Our army has repeatedly provided

international aid to peoples fighting for the freedom and independence of their motherland.

The traditions of patriotism and internationalism are handed down from generation to generation of the armed defenders of the Soviet nation as a glorious relay. At present, serving in the Army and Navy are men who did not experience the severe hardships which befell their fathers and grandfathers. But they are loyal to the heroic traditions of our army and people. If the interests of national security and the defense of peace and progress so require, the Soviet military will appear before the world as unselfish courageous internationalist patriots who are ready to surmount any difficulties. They carry out their duty in the single formation of the Warsaw Pact armies. The military-political defensive alliance of socialist states embodies an unprecedented type in history of truly just, equal fraternal relations between peoples. It faithfully serves peace and represents an insurmountable barrier on the path of the aggressive aspirations of imperialism. "As long as the threat to peace and security exists," pointed out the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade M. S. Gorbachev, "the Warsaw Pact member nations in the future will do everything necessary to protect themselves against any encroachments."(6)

The Communist Party, the Soviet government and our people have deep faith in their Armed Forces and see in them a dependable shield for our multinational motherland and the guarantor of peaceful construction.

Indoctrinated in a spirit of deep loyalty to our party and our people, the men of the Army and Navy are unflaggingly increasing vigilance and combat readiness and are preparing to properly celebrate the 27th CPSU Congress.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Ideologicheskaya rabota v Vooruzhennykh Silakh SSSR" [Ideological Work in the USSR Armed Forces], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1983, p 71.
2. Ibid.
3. V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 30, pp 44-45.
4. "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna 1941-1945. Entsiklopediya" [The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. An Encyclopedia], Moscow, Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1985, p 519.
5. "Materialy Plenuma Tsentralnogo Komiteta KPSS, 23 aprelya 1985 goda" [Materials of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee of 23 April 1985], Moscow, Politizdat, 1985, pp 22-23.
6. M. S. Gorbachev, "Bessmertnyy podvig sovetskogo naroda" [The Immortal Feat of the Soviet People], Moscow, Politizdat, 1985, p 25.

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ON THE QUESTION OF STRATEGIC OPERATIONS IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 85 pp 10-23

[Material prepared by Maj Gen V. V. Gurkin and Lt Gen (Ret) M. I. Golovnin; the first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]


[Text] The editors of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL have received letters commenting that in a number of historical works and journal articles there has been a differing approach to setting the names and the number of strategic operations conducted by the Soviet Armed Forces during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

The editors offer for discussion the material prepared by Maj Gen V. V. Gurkin and Lt Gen (Ret) M. I. Golovnin and ask the journal readers to voice their opinion on the question raised.

The Soviet Armed Forces during the years of the last war conducted offensive and defensive strategic operations as an aggregate of operations and combat coordinated in aim, place and time of the attacks and executed by the field forces and formations of the different Armed Services for achieving strategic goals.(1) The basic criteria by which one or another operation can be classified as strategic, in our opinion, are the following:

- a) The carrying out of important strategic missions and the achieving of major military-political goals;
- b) In a majority of operations great spatial scope of combat operations and the involvement of significant men and weapons in them;
- c) Planning by Hq SHC [Headquarters Supreme High Command] and the coordinating of the actions of the fronts, naval forces and other Armed Services by Headquarters representatives.

In such strategic defensive operations during the first period of the war as the Baltic, Belorussian, Lwow-Chernovtsy, Leningrad, Smolensk, Kiev, Moscow, Donbass-Rostov, Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad, Stalingrad and Northern Caucasus, the Soviet troops defeated large enemy groupings and forced it to go over to the defensive and this thwarted the plan for a "blitzkrieg" and established



conditions for the going over of our troops to a counteroffensive and then a general offensive.

In the course of the offensive strategic operations, major enemy groupings were defeated on the most important strategic sectors, economically and politically important areas were liberated, the allies of Nazi Germany were knocked out of the war, and the countries of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe were liberated from the Nazi invaders.

The major strategic offensive operations involved from 100 to 200 divisions, 20,000-40,000 guns and mortars, from 3,000 to 6,000 tanks and SAU [self-propelled artillery mount], from 2,000 to 7,500 aircraft. For example, the four fronts involved in the Belorussian Offensive Operation included 1.4 million men, 31,000 guns and mortars, 5,200 tanks and SAU and 5,000 combat aircraft. In the Vistula-Oder Offensive Operation there were 2.2 million men, 33,500 guns and mortars, 7,000 tanks and SAU and 5,000 combat aircraft while in the Berlin Operation there were 2.5 million men, 42,000 guns and mortars, 6,200 tanks and SAU and 7,500 combat aircraft.

In the 1941 Moscow Defensive Operation just the combat formations and units of Soviet troops involved over 807,000 men, around 7,000 guns and mortars, 780 tanks and more than 345 combat aircraft.

The Central and Voronezh Fronts alone, by the start of the Kursk Defensive Operation in 1943, numbered 1,336,000 men, over 19,000 guns and mortars, 3,444 tanks and SAU and 2,172 combat aircraft.

Regardless that certain defensive and offensive operations in the Great Patriotic War in terms of their scope and the number of men and weapons involved in them were not major, in the course of them important strategic missions were carried out and HQ SHC and its representatives planned them and coordinated the actions of the field forces. For this reason, we also consider it advisable to put them among the strategic ones. Thus, in the 1941 Odessa-Melitopol Defensive Operation was conducted by just the forces of the Southern Front, the Separate Maritime Army and a portion of the forces of the Black Sea Fleet and Azov Naval Flotilla. In the course of it the Soviet troops repelled enemy attacks on the strategic maritime sector and for a period of more than 2 months defended a strategically important object, the port and city of Odessa, tying down large enemy forces. As a result the enemy's plans to quickly reach the Donbass area and capture it were thwarted.

Also of strategic significance was the Kerch-Feodosiya Landing Operation of the Transcaucasian Front (from 30 December the Caucasian Front) and the Black Sea Fleet in 1942. In the course of it a large amphibious landing was made on the Kerch Peninsula. The landed troops from the two all-arms armies initiated an offensive and advanced 100-110 km into the peninsula, capturing a beachhead on which the Crimean Front was developed.

The offensive operation carried out in January 1943 to lift the blockade of Leningrad and involving a portion of the forces from the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts and the Baltic Fleet in terms of scope and the amount of resources involved in it was insignificant, but its results also were of strategic

significance. The Leningrad blockade was lifted and land communications restored for this important political, economic and strategic center of the nation.

The 1943 Kiev Offensive Operation was conducted by the forces of just the First Ukrainian Front and to a shallow depth. However, in the course of it the enemy suffered a major defeat, a politically and strategically important center was liberated, the capital of the Ukraine, Kiev, and on the western bank of the Dnieper a strategic bridgehead was formed to a depth of up to 150 km.

As a result of the Novorossiysk-Taman Offensive Operation in 1943, troops of the Northern Caucasus Front and forces of the Black Sea Fleet and Azov Naval Flotilla completed the liberation of the Caucasus, they dealt a major defeat to the 17th Army of the Nazi Army Group "A" and eliminated an important strategic enemy beachhead which supported its defenses of the Crimea and the possibility of offensive operations in the Caucasus. The liberation of Novorossiysk and the Taman Peninsula significantly improved the basing of the Black Sea Fleet and created good conditions for attacks against the enemy Crimean Grouping from the sea and across the Kerch Strait.

The Vyborg-Petrozavodsk Offensive Operation of 1944, although small in scope and conducted by a portion of the forces of the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts as well as the Baltic Fleet, ended with a major defeat for the enemy troops on the Karelian Isthmus and in Southern Karelia. The enemy was thrown back to the Soviet-Finnish frontier virtually along its entire extent and this accelerated the pulling out of Finland from the war.

The Crimean Offensive Operation of 1944 conducted by the small Fourth Ukrainian Front, by the Separate Maritime Army and by a portion of the forces of the Black Sea Fleet, ended with the defeat of a major enemy troop grouping and the liberation of the economically and strategically important area, the Crimean Peninsula, and the main naval base of the Black Sea Fleet, Sevastopol.

The Petsamo-Kirkennes Operation of 1944 conducted by a portion of the forces of the Karelian Front and the Northern Fleet under Arctic conditions, was of important strategic significance. Its result was the expulsion of German occupiers from the Soviet Arctic, the return to the nation of valuable nickel mines, the liberation of Northern Norway and the establishing of favorable conditions for Northern Fleet operations in the Barents Sea.

In the military history works and military periodicals which have been published, differing data have been given on the number of strategic operations conducted by the Soviet Armed Forces during the years of the Great Patriotic War. In one instance it was felt that a total of 50 strategic operations was conducted while in another that 50 strategic operations were conducted solely by the forces of groups of fronts. There is a great difference of opinions on classifying one or another operation as strategic.

In thoroughly assessing the nature of the conducted operations, in our opinion, it is valid to feel that during the years of the last war the Soviet Armed Forces conducted 52 strategic operations. In them are 37 offensive ones

and 15 defensive ones. Here 42 strategic operations were conducted by the forces of groups of fronts, 7 on maritime sectors with the forces of one front and the involvement of the navy and 3 with the forces of just one front alone.

Below we offer for discussion by the readers a list of strategic operations conducted by the Soviet Armed Forces during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

FOOTNOTE

1. See: "sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, voyenizdat, Vol 7, 1979, p 55

STRATEGIC OPERATIONS OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES IN THE GREAT PATRIOT WAR, 1941-1945

No	Name & time of operations	Forces in operation	Opposing enemy forces	scope of oper.			Result of operation
				front, km	depth, km	7	
1	Baltic Def. Oper. (22 Jun-9 Jul 41)	3	4	5	6	7	First Period of War (22 Jun 41-18 Nov 42)
1	NW Front, Baltic Fleet (part)	Army Group [AG] Center, part of 3d Tk Gr & 9th A of AG Center, 1st Air Fleet [AF]	350-450	400-500	By fire & counterattacks of all arms forces, by counterstrikes of III & XII mech. corps, great harm caused to advancing enemy grouping, its strike power reduced & rate of advance lowered, allowing our troops to prepare def. lines in depth & bring up fresh reserves	By fire & counterattacks of all arms forces, by counterstrikes of III & XII mech. corps, great harm caused to advancing enemy grouping, its strike power reduced & rate of advance lowered, allowing our troops to prepare def. lines in depth & bring up fresh reserves	
2	Belorussian Def. Oper. (22 Jun-9 Jul 41)	W Front, Pinsk Naval Flotilla	AG Center, 2d AF	450-800	450-600	By resistance on intermed. lines, by counterstrikes of mech. corps & all-arms units, great harm to main Nazi grouping, rate of its advance slowed, allowing deployment of 2d strat. echelon on line of middle courses of W. Dvina & Dnieper rivers from Kraslava to Loyev	By resistance on intermed. lines, by counterstrikes of mech. corps & all-arms units, great harm to main Nazi grouping, rate of its advance slowed, allowing deployment of 2d strat. echelon on line of middle courses of W. Dvina & Dnieper rivers from Kraslava to Loyev
3	Lwow-Chernovtsiy Def. Oper. (22 Jun-6 Jul 41)	SW & S fronts	AG South, 4h AF, VIII Hung. Corps	600-700	300-350	By fire strikes of all-arms armies, by counterstrikes by mech. corps in areas of Dubno, Lutsk & Rovno, great harm to enemy, advance of main grouping checked, allowing start of pull back to old frontier of fortified areas on line of Korosten, Novograd-Volynskiy, Shepetovka, Starokonstantinov, Proskurov	By fire strikes of all-arms armies, by counterstrikes by mech. corps in areas of Dubno, Lutsk & Rovno, great harm to enemy, advance of main grouping checked, allowing start of pull back to old frontier of fortified areas on line of Korosten, Novograd-Volynskiy, Shepetovka, Starokonstantinov, Proskurov

Table (con't.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4	Arctic Def. Oper. (29 Jun-10 Oct 41)	N (from 1 Sep 41) Karelian Front, Nor. Army Corps, part Fleet, Wh. of Luftwaffe Sea Naval Flotilla	Ger. Army Norway, part of 5 AF, III Fin. Front, Nor. Army Corps, part Fleet, Wh. of Luftwaffe Sea Naval Flotilla	500	35-75	Defeat dealt to enemy, its advance halted, plan thwarted to take Murmansk, major port & naval base in north of nation
5	Kiev Def. Oper. (7 Jul-26 Sep 41)	SW Front, part of AG Bryansk & S fronts & Pinsk Nav. Flotilla	AC South, part of AG Center (2 FA & 2 TGr) 4h AF	300	600	Over more than 2 mo. of battles great losses to enemy which forced Ger. Com. to use part of AG Center (2 FA & 2 TGr) to achieve aims here, thereby slowing advance on main (Moscow) axis
6	Leningrad Def. Oper. (10 Jul-10 Sep 41)	N (from 28 Aug 41 Leningrad) NW fronts, Baltic Flt.,	AG North, 1 AF, SE Fin. Army	450	270-300	Losses caused to enemy, advance halted & plan to capture Leningrad without halt checked
7	Smolensk Def. Oper. (Battle of Smolensk) 10 Jul-10 Sep 41)	W, Central, AG Center, 2d Bryansk & Reserve fronts	AG Center, 2d AF, part of 16 A of AG North	600-650	200-250	Major defeat dealt to enemy, advance checked on main axis for 2 mos., playing major role in thwarting "Blitzkrieg" plan
8	Odessa-Melitopol Def. Oper. (10 Aug-29 Sep 41)	S Front. Part of AG Sep. Mar. Army, part of Black Sea Flt. Azov Naval Flotilla	South, 4h AF, Rom. & Ger. navies in Black Sea	400-500	400	Great damage to enemy, our heroic defenders of major strat. object on Black Sea Coast, Odessa, for 2 mos. tied down large enemy group stopping enemy from quickly attaining its goal of taking Donbass
9	Donbass-Rostov Def. Oper. (29 Sep-11 Oct 41)	SW & S fronts, Azov. Nav. Flotilla	AG South, 4h AF	400-670	150-300	Enemy caused heavy losses. Its further advance checked

Table (con't.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10	Moscow Def. Oper. (30 Sep-5 Dec 41)	W, Kalinin, AG Center, Reserve & Bryansk fronts	part of 16 ⁴ of AG North, 2d AF	700-1100	300-350	Enemy suffers heavy losses, its advance stopped & conditions created for going over to counter- offensive by our troops
11	Moscow Off. Oper. (5 Dec 41-7 Jan 42)	Kalinin, W & SW fronts	AG Center, Luftwaffe Oper. Gr. Ost	1000	100-250	Losses to 38 enemy divisions, incl. 15 tank & motorized ores. Our troops advance 100-250 km to west
12	Kerch-Feodosiya Landing Oper. (25 Dec 41-2 Jan 42)	Transcauca- sus (from 30 of AG South, Dec 41 Cau- part of 4h AF casus) Front, BS Fleet & Azov Naval Flotilla ^a	Part of 11h A part of NW fronts & Oper. Gr. Ost	250	100-110	Landing made on Kerch Peninsula with 2 all-arms armies, armies advance 100-110 km, important beachhead taken on which Crimean Front is fielded in aim of sub- sequent liberation of Crimea
13	Rzhev-Vyazma Off. Oper. (8 Jan-20 Apr 42)	Kalinin & W fronts & Luftwaffe part of NW front	AG Center, Luftwaffe Oper. Gr. Ost	650	80-250	Soviet troops defeat enemy, advancing 80-250 km. In these battles AG Center loses 330,000 men
14	Voronezh-Voro- shilograd Def. Oper. (28 Jun- 24 Jul 42)	Bryansk, Voronezh, SW & S fronts	AG South, 4h AF	900	150-400	Major defeat to enemy, its ad- vancing shock groups weakened, preventing it from achieving aims in operation
15	Stalingrad Def. Oper. (17 Jul- 18 Nov 42)	Stalingrad (Don), SE fronts	AG B, 4h AF	250-500	150	Defeat dealt to enemy, its ad- vance halted & conditions created for our troops to go over to counteroffensive
16	Northern Caucasus Def. Oper. (25 Jul-31 Dec 42)	S (to 28 Jul), N Caucasus & Rom. navies in Transcaucasus fronts, BS Fleet	AG A, part of N Cau-4h AF, Ger. & Rom. navies in Transcaucasus Black Sea fronts, BS	320-1000	400-800	Defeat dealt, enemy advance stopped, its plan to capture Caucasus oilfields thwarted

Table (con't.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Second Period of War (19 Oct 42-31 Dec 43)						
17	Stalingrad Off. Oper. (19 Nov 42- 2 Feb 43)	SW, Don & Stalingrad fronts, Volga Flot.	AG B (from 22 Nov., AG Don), 4h AF	850	150-200	Defeat of 6h Field & 4h Tank armies, 4h & 5h Romanian armies
18	Northern Caucasus Off. Oper. (1 Jan-4 Feb 43)	S, TC & NC fronts	AG A, part of 4h AF	840	300-600	Defeat of AG A, its troops thrown back 300-600 km to west, threat lifted from Caucasus oilfields
19	Operation to break Leningrad blockade (12-30 Jan 43)	part of Leningrad, Volkhov fronts & Baltic Fleet	18h A of AG North, part of 1t AF	45	60	Defeat dealt to enemy, blockade lifted and Leningrad's land com- munications restored; enemy plan to starve millions in city thwarted
20	Voronezh-Kharkov Off. Oper. (13 Jan-3 Mar 43)	Voronezh Front, part of Bryansk & SW fronts	AG B, part of 4h AF	250-400	360-520	Soviet troops deal major defeat to AG B & liberate Kharkov industrial region
21	Voroshilovgrad- Rostov Off. Oper. (1 Jan-18 Feb 43)	SW & S fronts	AG Don, part of AG B (Freter Riko Arm. Gr., 8h Ital. Army), part of 4h AF	150	120-250	Soviet troops rout enemy 1st TA, advance 120-250 km to west & liberate northern part of Donbass
22	Kharkov Def. Oper (18 Feb- 25 Mar 43)	SW & Voronezh fronts	AG South, part of AG Center	300-350	100-150	Enemy suffers great loss, its counteroffensive halted & plan thwarted to surround our troops in area of Kursk
23	Rzhev-Vyazma Off. Oper. (2- 31 Mar 43)	Kalinin & W fronts	AG Center, part of 6h AF	200	130-160	Rzhev-Vyazma enemy bridgehead eliminated, our troops advance 130-160 km, front line shortened, large enemy forces tied down, pre- venting their shift to S wing of Soviet-German Front

Table (con't.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
24	Kursk Def. Oper. (5 Jul-23 Jul 43)	Central, Voronezh & Steppe fronts	2d & 9h A of AG Center, 4h TA & Oper. Gr. Kampf of AG South,	500	10-35	In course of defensive engagements, enemy shock groupings worn down, bled white and halted. Conditions created for our troops to go over to counteroffensive
25	Orel Off. Oper. (12 Jul-18 Aug 43)	Bryansk, Central fronts, part of W Front	4h & 6h AF 2d & 9h A of AG Center, 6h AF	400	150	15 enemy divisions defeated, Soviet troops advance to 150 km & liberate significant territory from occupiers
26	Belgorod-Kharkov Off. Oper. (3 Aug-23 Aug 43)	Voronezh & Steppe fronts, part of SW Front	4h TA & Oper. Gr. Kampf of AG South, part of 4h AF	300-400	140	15 enemy divisions defeated, our troops advance 140 km, having widened breach to 400 km along front & liberating Kharkov industrial zone
27	Smolensk Off. Oper. (7 Aug- 2 Oct 43)	Kalinin & W fronts	3d TA, 2d & 9h A of AG Center, 6h AF	400	200-250	Smolensk Oblast liberated, part of Kalinin, start made to liberation of Belorussia, 7 divisions destroyed and 14 enemy divisions with heavy losses
28	Donbass Off. Oper. (13 Aug- 22 Sep 43)	SW & S fronts	1t TA & 6h A, part of 8h A of AG South, part of 4h AF	450	300	Soviet troops defeat 13 enemy divisions, liberate Donbass & reach Dnieper, capturing bridgeheads on right bank. Important economic region returned to nation. With reaching of Dnieper & Molochnaya rivers by Soviet troops, good conditions created for liberation of right-bank Ukraine & N. Tauria

Table (con't.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
29	Chernigov-Poltava Off. Oper. (26 Aug-30 Sep 43)	Central, Voronezh & Steppe fronts	2d A of AG Center, 4h TA & 8h A of AG South, part of 4h & 6h AF	600	250-300	Troops of 3 fronts reach Dnieper & capture bridgeheads on its W bank, important for operations to liberate Belorussia and right-bank Ukraine. In course of operation, 17 enemy divisions routed
30	Novorossiysk-Taman Off. Oper. (10 Sep-9 Oct 43)	NC Front, BS Fleet, Azov Nav. Flotilla	17h A of AG A, part of 4h AF	80	160	Liberation of Caucasus completed, important enemy bridgehead eliminated supporting defense of Crimea & possibility of advance in Caucasus. Liberation of Novorossiysk & Taman Peninsula significantly improves basing of BS Fleet & creates good conditions for attacks on enemy Crimean grouping from the sea & across Kerch Strait
31	Lower Dniepr Off. Oper. (26 Sep-20 Dec 43)	Steppe (2d UF [Uk. Fr.]) of AG South, SW (3d UF), S (4h UF) fronts	1t TA & 8h A of AG A, 6h A of AG A, 4h AF	400	300	Troops of 3 fronts liberate significant part of left-bank Ukraine & almost all N. Tauria, cutting off from land the Crimean enemy grouping & capturing bridgeheads on W bank of Dnieper over 400 km long and to 100 km in depth
32	Kiev Off. Oper. (3 Nov-13 Nov 43)	1t UF	2d A of AG Center, 4h TA of AG South, part of 4h AF	325-500	150	Troops of front liberate capital of Ukraine, Kiev, & capture strat. bridgehead on right bank of Dnieper to depth of 150 km. In course of operation 15 enemy divisions destroyed, incl. 2 tank and 1 motorized

Table (con't.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Third Period of War (Jan 44-May 45)						
33	Dnieper-Carpathian lt., 2d, 3d & AG South & Off. Oper. (24 Dec 4h UF 43-17 Apr 44)	AG A, 4h AF	1300-1400	250-450	Soviet troops reach Carpathian foothills & state frontier with Romania & split S. wing of enemy strat. front. In course of operation, 10 divisions & 1 brigade of AG South and AG A destroyed, with over 60 divisions suffering losses from 1/2 to 3/4 of personnel	
34	Leningrad-Novgorod Leningrad, Off. Oper. (14 Jan-1 Mar 44)	AG North, 1t AF & 2d Baltic fronts, Baltic Flt.	600	220-280	Heavy defeat dealt to AG North, with 23 enemy divisions destroyed; Soviet troops advance to approaches to Soviet Baltic. Leningrad completely freed of enemy blockade	
35	Crimean Off. Oper. (8 Apr-12 May 44)	17h A of AG A, part of 4h AF, Mar. A, BS Flt., Azov Nav. Flot. & Rom. navies in Black Sea	160	200-260	Enemy 17h A defending Crimea with 17 divisions & large number of sep. units complete destroyed.	
20					Crimea, an imp. economic region in hands of Soviet Army which was very important for improving conditions for basing and action of Black Sea Fleet	
36	Vyborg-Petrozavodsk Off. Oper. (10 Jun-9 Aug 44)	Leningrad & Karelian fronts, Baltic Flt., Ladoga & Omega Nav. Flotillas	260	110-250	Serious defeat dealt to enemy troops defending Karelian Isthmus & Southern Karelia. Enemy thrown back to Soviet-Finnish frontier along entire length, creating prerequisites for liberation of Soviet Arctic and withdrawal of Finl. and from the war	

Table (con't.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
37	Belorussian Off. Oper. (23 Jun- 29 Aug 44)	1t Baltic, AG Center, 3d, 2d & 1t part of 16h A Belorussian of AG North, fronts, 4h TA of AG Dnieper Nav. N. Ukraine, Flotilla 6h AF	1100	550-600	AG Center suffers crushing de- feat, with 17 divisions & 3 brigades destroyed. 50 divisions lost over $\frac{1}{2}$ of personnel. Belo- russia & part of Lithuania libera- ted, good conditions created for launching attacks at enemy group- ings in Baltic, East Prussia & Poland	
38	Lwow-Sandomierz Off. Oper. (13 Jul-29 Aug 44)	1t UF AG N. Ukraine, part of 4h AF	440	350	Major defeat dealt to AG Northern Ukraine, western oblasts of Ukraine & SE regions of Poland cleared of occupiers. Major bridgehead cap- tured on W bank of Vistula of major importance for subsequent offensive on Silesian axis	
39	Iasi-Kishinev Off. Oper. (20 Aug-29 Aug 44)	2d & 3d UF, AG S. Ukraine, part of BS part of 4h AF, Fleet & Danube Flotilla	500	300-320	AG Southern Ukraine completely defeated. 33 German divisions des- troyed & virtually all Romanian divisions on the front. This led to collapse of enemy defenses on S. wing of Soviet-German Front. Moldavia liberated, Romania with- draws from Nazi bloc and declares war on Germany	
40	Eastern Carpathian Off. Oper. (8 Sep-28 Oct 44)	4h UF, part Heinrichi AG of 1t UF, (1t TA, 1t Hung. A), 1t Czech. Army Corps part of 4h AF	400	50-110	Defeat of Heinrichi AG, Carpathian Ukraine liberated. Soviet troops cross Main Carpathian Range & enter Slovak territory	

Table (con't.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4.1	Baltic Off. Oper. (14 Sep-24 Oct 44)	Leningrad, 3d, 2d & 1t Baltic fronts, part of 3d	AG North, part of 3d TA of AG Center, 1t AF, part of 6h AF Belor. F & Baltic Flt.	1000	300	Liberation of Baltic completed (except Courland). Of the 59 enemy formations at start of operation, 29 were routed and rest isolated in Courland and sealed off. Nazi AG North had significantly lost its strat. importance Maj. defeat dealt to enemy group defending Yugoslavia, with eastern and southeastern regions of nation and its capital Belgrad liberated. Nazi Command was forced to start hurried pullout of troops from Greece & Albania
4.2	Belgrad Off. Oper. (28 Sep-20 Oct 44)	3d UF, Yugo-slav troops, Serbia, AG F, 1t, 2d & 4h Luftwaffe Bulg. armies, Oper. Gr. Danube SE Flotilla	400-600	200	Soviet troops in cooperation with naval forces defeat enemy troop grouping in Arctic, liberate N. regions of Norway & create good conditions for N. Fleet operations in Barents Sea	
4.3	Petsamo-Kirkennes Off. Oper. (7 Oct-29 Oct 44)	Troops of 14t20h Ger. A & 7h Air Mountain A, A of Karelian5h AF, Ger. Front, N. Navy in Fleet Barents Sea	80	150	Soviet troops liberate central regions of Hungary & its capital Budapest & surround & destroy the 188,000-strong Budapest enemy grouping. Hungary withdraws from the war & good conditions created for advance into Czechoslovakia & Austria	
4.4	Budapest Off. Oper. (29 Oct 44-13 Feb 45)	2d & 3d UF, Danube Flotilla	Troops of AG South, part of 4h AF	420	250-400	Soviet troops deal major defeat to enemy, advancing 500 km & capturing bridgeheads of W. bank of Oder. In course of operation, 26 enemy division routed and 35 destroyed
4.5	Vistula-Oder Off. Oper. (12 Jan-3 Feb 45)	1t Belor. & 1t Uk. fronts	Troops of AG A (from 26 Jan, AG Center), 6h AF	500	500	

Table (con't.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
46	Western Carpathian 4h & 2d UF Off. Oper. (12 Jan-18 Feb 45)	1t Ger. TA, 1t Hung. A of AG A (from 26 Jan, AG Center), 6h & 8h A of AG South, part of 4h AF	440	170-230	Our troops defeat enemy, advancing 170-230 km, liberating southern parts of Poland & part of Czech territory. In course of operation, 17 enemy divisions and 1 brigade defeated	
47	East Prussian Off. Oper. (13 Jan-25 Apr 45)	2d & 3d Belor. F, part of 1t Baltic Fr. & Baltic Flt. Sea	AG Center (from 550 26 Jan, AG North), part of 6h AF, Ger. Navy in Baltic Sea	150-200	Soviet troops capture E. Prussia. In course of operation, 25 enemy division destroyed & 12 divisions suffer heavy losses. Enemy sealanes completely disrupted, sharply im- peding supply of Courland grouping 21 enemy divisions & 8 brigades routed, threat eliminated of enemy counterstrike in flank & rear of lt Belorussian Front, E. Pomerania cleared of Nazi troops. Reaching of Baltic Coast by Soviet troops pro- tects flank of main Soviet Army strategic grouping fighting on Berlin axis.	
48	East Pomeranian Off. Oper. (10 Feb-4 Apr 45)	1t & 2d Belor. fronts, part of Baltic Flt.	460	120-140		
49	Vienna Off. Oper. (16 Mar-15 Apr 45)	3d & 3d UF, Danube Flotilla	Troops of AG South, part of AG E, 4h AF	230	150-250	Liberation of Hungary complete, enemy cleared out of E. Austria & capital Vienna. In course of opera- tion, Soviet troops routed 32 enemy divisions
50	Berlin Off. Oper. (16 Apr-8 May 45)	Troops of 1t & 2d Belor. & 1t Uk. fronts, Danube Flotilla	AG Vistula, 4h TA of AG Center, 6h AF, AF Reich	300	100-120	In course of operation, Soviet troops routed 70 infantry, 23 tank & motorized divisions, captured 480,000 men & took German capital, Berlin

Table (con't.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
51	Prague Off. Oper. (6-11 May 45)	1t, 2, 8 4h UF	AG Center, 8h A, part of 6h TA SS of AG Austria, 4h AF	1200	160-200	In course of operation, last enemy grouping of 860,000 men in Czechoslovakia surrounded & taken prisoner. Czechoslovakia & its capital Prague liberated of Nazi occupation
Campaign in the Far East (August 1945)						
52	Manchurian Off. Oper. (9 Aug- 2 Sep 45)	Transbay- kal, 1t & 2d FE	Kwantung Army (1t, 3d, 17h fronts, 4h A, Pacific Fleet & armies), Man- chukuo Army, Amur Flo- tilla, army of Prince Mongolian formations	2700	200-800	Kwantung Army and puppet armies of Japan in Manchuria & N. China defeated. Soviet troops advance 200-800 km liberating Manchuria, Northeast China & N. part of Korea. Defeat of Kwantung Army & loss of military economic base in China & Korea deprive Japan of real forces for continuing the war

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ACHIEVING SURPRISE FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

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[Article by Maj Gen P. T. Kunitskiy]

[Text] Victory on the battlefields during the years of the Great Patriotic War was brought about by numerous factors. One of the important places among them was held by the achieving of surprise. Surprise, unexpected actions by the Soviet troops frequently stunned the enemy, paralyzed its will, deprived the enemy of the possibility of organized resistance and thereby created conditions to win the battle, engagement and operation with equal or even smaller forces, in a short period of time and with minimum losses. This clearly shows the high professional maturity and leadership skill of the Soviet commanders and their ability to creatively apply in practice the principles of military art.

Each operation of the Great Patriotic War and each battle had their particular features and stood out in the uniqueness of the combat situation. In this context the conditions and, consequently, the measures conducted to achieve surprise were diverse.

Of primary importance was a profound knowledge of the opposing enemy, the prompt disclosure of its plan of actions and an accurate assessment of the forces, means and combat capabilities. The experience of the war showed that when the commanders, staffs and personnel of the field forces, formations and units had a poor knowledge of the strong and weak points of the enemy and the procedures and methods of actions favored by it, there could be no question of surprise. Every battle, every operation affirmed the old saying: "If you know your enemy and yourself, you can fight a hundred times without any danger; if you know yourself but do not know the enemy, you will be victorious once and the next time be defeated."

The enemy had to be seen as it was, without exaggerating or understating anything. If an underestimation of enemy capability blunted vigilance and led to a divorcing of the plan of actions from the real situation and ultimately to unjustified losses and the nonfulfillment of the combat mission, the overestimation of the enemy gave rise to indecisiveness and the undermining of confidence in one's own forces. During the first days of the war, when the enemy had the initiative, one of the directives for the operational army

stated: "Do not overestimate enemy forces, do not feel that it is strong, that it is not suffering losses and for this reason is steadfast and invincible. On the contrary, the enemy is suffering great losses and is finding it difficult to hold out under our attacks."(1)

Of great importance for achieving surprise were the **maintaining of secrecy concerning the plan for the operation (combat) and the covert preparation of the troops for combat**. This was basically achieved by deceiving the enemy, by misleading it and by skillfully executed camouflage. Here are just some examples.

After the heavy defensive engagements for us in the south of the nation in the summer of 1942 (in the area of Stalingrad and in the Northern Caucasus), the Nazi military leadership felt that the Soviet troops were unable to conduct a major offensive here. The Operational Order From the High Command of the Nazi Ground Forces No 1 of 14 October 1942 stated: "The Russians themselves in the course of the recent battles have been seriously weakened and in the winter of 1942-1943 will not be able to field such large forces as they did last winter."

In order to conceal from the enemy the concentration of large forces on the southern wing of the front, the Soviet troops along with other measures intensified combat in the summer and autumn of 1942 on the western sector opposite the German Army Group Center. According to the plans of Hq SHC, these were to mislead and effectively did mislead the enemy and created the impression that a winter operation was being prepared here and in no other place. For this reason, in October the Nazi Command began concentrating a large number of troops opposite our western fronts.

The enemy, thus, was unable to detect the preparations by our command for the counteroffensive at Stalingrad. After the war the former Chief of Staff of Operational Leadership of the Nazi Armed Forces Jodl admitted that they had not been able to detect the concentration of Soviet troops opposite the left flank of the von Paulus Army. "We absolutely had no idea of the strength of the Russian troops in this area. Previously there had been nothing here and all of a sudden an attack of great force was launched and this was of crucial significance."(2)

Instructive in the sense of misleading the enemy was the preparations for the Warsaw-Poznan Operation by the First Belorussian Front and which was a major component of the Vistula-Oder Operation.

In preparing for the operation, the shock troops on the selected sectors of the offensive were established under the appearance of a further strengthening of the defenses. The corresponding orders and instructions were worked out and issued to the troops. The formations, units and subunits located on the bridgehead further built up their occupied lines. The engineer organization of the areas for the armies newly introduced to the bridgehead was carried out by the defensive construction directorates (UOS) and by the front engineer units, while the engineer units of the armies assigned for the offensive were employed in the rear. With the personnel talks and meetings were conducted in

the aim of mobilizing their efforts to hold the Magnuszew and Pulawy bridgeheads.

Since the enemy could detect the major axes for attacks by the Soviet troops from the presence of large tank groupings on the fronts, great importance was given to the camouflaging of the tank armies. As a rule, these were concentrated in forests and their personnel was prohibited from having any contact with the local population. The tanks and vehicles were painted a different color and the emblems removed. The tank commanders went out on reconnaissance in an all-arms uniform.

These and other measures helped to keep secret the offensive being readied by our troops. The Nazis, regardless of the efforts undertaken, were unable to establish the precise areas of concentration of the 1st Guards Tank Army, the 33d Army, the 3d Shock Army and the 5th Shock Army and were unable to determine the true number and strength of the formations comprising the First Belorussian Front. For example, enemy intelligence considered that the First Belorussian Front had 31 divisions instead of the actual 68. As a result, the enemy was not expecting a strike of such force.

For misleading the enemy on the axis of the forthcoming offensive, good results were achieved by false movements of troops and transport, feints on the forward edge by reconnaissance groups, the simulating of the concentration of men and weapons and the setting up of dummy command and observation posts in areas where active combat was not to be carried out. Thus, in preparing for the Belgorod-Kharkov Operation the simulating of troop concentrations was carried out on the right wing of the Voronezh Front in the area of the 38th Army, while the main thrust was to be made by the front on the left wing. In order to conceal this, in the formations and units of the 38th Army, they set up false artillery positions, dummy tanks and SAU were set out, specially assigned troops carried out a "regrouping" (during the day toward the front line and at night from the front to the rear), and over the telephone false orders were issued to prepare an offensive on this sector. Simulation played its role as here the enemy kept large forces, including a tank division.(3)

Operational camouflage also contributed to concealing the planned actions. Experience showed that this produced positive results under certain conditions, primarily when it was realistic, convincing, diverse in form and content and uninterrupted from the start to the end of actions. All the measures were aimed at making the enemy believe in the false situation being created and taking an erroneous decision.

The October 1943 offensive by the First Ukrainian Front showed that further operations on the Bukrin bridgehead were ill-advised, as operational surprise had been lost and the enemy had been able to strengthen its defenses and increase the troop density on this sector of the front. Moreover the difficult terrain conditions in the area of the bridgehead impeded the maneuvering of men and weapons and primarily the tank formations.

On 24 October 1943, Hq SHC issued instructions to the commander of the First Ukrainian Front to shift the main effort to the Lyutezh bridgehead and carry out the mission of liberating Kiev not with the previous forces but rather by

a new troop grouping to the north of the city.(4) In accord with the plan for the Kiev Offensive Operation the regrouping was to be carried out by the 3d Guards Tank Army, the VII Artillery Breakthrough Corps, the XXIII Rifle Corps and a number of other formations and units. The mission was a difficult one. Initially in a short period of time hundreds of tanks and SAU, guns, armored personnel carriers and motor vehicles were to secretly cross back from the Bukrin bridgehead, then make an almost 200-km march along the front and, finally, having crossed the Desna, recross the Dnieper to the Lyutezh bridgehead.

The success of the regrouping was aided by the skillfully executed measures to camouflage our troops and disinform the enemy. The troop movement was carried out only at night and all the tanks and vehicles traveled with darkened headlights. On the Bukrin bridgehead, in the place of the tanks and guns which had departed for the other area, dummies were set out and the radios of the 3d Guards Tank Army continued to operate.

In order to mislead the enemy on the location of the main thrust, on 1 November the troops remaining on the Bukrin bridgehead went over to the offensive. The offensive on the sector of the main thrust (from the Lyutezh bridgehead) which commenced on 3 November was a surprise for the Nazis. Combat operations developed successfully and on 6 November the troops of the First Ukrainian Front liberated Kiev.

The achieving of surprise was also aided by the prompt and correct consideration of the situation developing on the front and by the skillful choice of the time and method of actions. The most indicative in this regard was the Battle of Moscow of 1941-1942.

As is known, Army Group Center in the course of the Moscow Offensive had extended its forces for 1,000 km. Its flank assault groupings were in an extremely bad situation. The troops of the Kalinin Front hung over the left wing and rear of the northern grouping, while the southern one was outflanked by the armies on the left wing of the Western Front and the right wing of the Southwestern Front. The Nazi troops had exhausted their offensive capabilities and their operational reserves had been committed to battle.

Hq SHC considered the developing situation and carefully planned and implemented the counteroffensive in the course of which the main efforts were concentrated on defeating the most dangerous enemy shock groupings threatening Moscow from the north and the south.

The time for going over to the counteroffensive was also successfully chosen. It started without a pause, in the course of a heavy defensive battle, at a moment when the Nazi troops were unable to go over to the defensive while the Nazi Command was convinced that the Soviet Army was incapable of large-scale active offensive operations.

The counteroffensive in the Battle of the Kursk Salient started at a time when a defensive engagement was being fought on the Belgorod-Kharkov axis and the enemy had just been stopped on the Orel axis. Troops from the left wing of the Western and Bryansk Fronts not involved in repelling an enemy thrust,

launched an attack on the Orel axis on 12 July 1943. The armies on the right wing of the Central Front went over to a counteroffensive on 15 July after 3-day softening up. The Nazis had not yet recovered from the attack at Orel when on 3 August there followed an attack by troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts in cooperation with the Southwestern Front on the Belgorod-Kharkov axis. The Nazi Command, not possessing data on the time and direction of these thrusts, was unable to organize its defenses and this ultimately led to the defeat of its main troop groupings.

Speed of actions played a major role in achieving surprise and as a result of this the enemy was caught unaware, it was late in organizing resistance on intermediate lines and was unable to fully utilize its operational reserves.

Instructive is the example of achieving surprise in the actions of the Southwestern Front for liberating Zaporozhye. During 10-12 October 1943, our units broke through the defenses of the Nazi troops and by the morning of 13 October had crossed the external defensive perimeter of Zaporozhye. In order to prevent the enemy from digging in on an intermediate line and on the internal perimeter, it was decided on the night of 14 October to storm the city counting on unconditional surprise. Further events were to show the correctness of this idea. After 10-minute artillery softening up, our units by a short thrust drove the enemy out of the positions of the second defensive perimeter and by the middle of the night had broken through it on a number of sectors. A tank corps and a mechanized corps were committed to the breach. At 0800 hours, by a simultaneous attack from all sides the storming of the city commenced. The rate gained during the nighttime engagement did not drop. Fierce hand-to-hand battles broke out. The guardsmen drove back the enemy everywhere and by 1300 hours on 14 October had completely captured Zaporozhye. The captured prisoners pointed out that our nighttime offensive was a complete surprise for them. The German Command considered that our forces had been exhausted the day before. Many officers had gone into the city for the night, the soldiers had laid down to sleep, expecting nothing except shock groups.(5) The street battles developed at such a rapid pace that the Nazis were unable to blow up the city and the Dnieper Dam.

In the course of the counteroffensive in Stalingrad in 1942, the XXIV Tank Corps, under the conditions of a harsh snowy winter, broke through into the operational depth of the Nazi troops and in 5 days advanced 240 km. Appearing unexpectedly in the enemy rear, the corps seized Tatsinskaya Station and a major airfield with the aircraft on it. The Nazi Command was forced to throw against the corps the 11th Tank Division and 306th Infantry Division as well as other troops which were destined to reinforce the main Nazi groupings. The rapid actions of the corps contributed to the successful carrying out of the missions in the operation.(6)

An indispensable condition for achieving surprise was the **employment of previously unknown, original procedures and methods of fighting**. The repetition of the same procedures and methods, including successful ones, led to routine. The enemy, figuring them out, was able to organize active resistance. In this context the abandoning of standard methods and the constant search for new versions for carrying out combat missions were a most important component in the activities of the commanders and staffs.

In the defensive engagement at Moscow, the tactics of mobile ambushes was employed skillfully and extensively. This was completely unexpected for the enemy. The tank troops from the 4th Tank Brigade under the command of Col M. Ye. Katukov, in fighting against two Guderian tank divisions advancing from Orel against Tula, in 7 days of an uneven duel against a 10-fold superior enemy, knocked out 133 tanks.(7)

Experience showed that in going over to an offensive, the best time was the hours before dawn when the enemy, worn out by daytime fighting was relieving the night relief by the day and conditions were created for destroying both reliefs by artillery fire. An attack at this time produced good results. But as soon as this became a rule, the enemy at dawn was more vigilant and ready to fight. Considering this, our command began to change the time for going over to the offensive. Attacks started at different times: in the day (in the first and second half of the day) and at night (with the onset of darkness, late at night and at dawn) and this confused the enemy and reduced its capabilities for serious resistance.

A definite pattern was the going over to the attack after the ending of artillery softening up. With the start of the rush by our infantry and tanks to the attack, artillery fire was shifted in depth. By this time the enemy had emerged from the shelters, was ready for combat, opened fire and caused substantial harm to the attackers. This required the use of a new method. They began going over to the attack during the period of artillery softening up and each time at a new time (for example, on the 27th, 38th and 44th minute) so that the Nazis did not know when and could not adapt to the conditions of fire and the attack.

Sometimes in the aim of achieving surprise the troops went over to the attack without artillery softening up, as was the case in the course of the Budapest Operation in crossing the Tisa and Danube Rivers.(8) Stunned by the unexpected attack the enemy was unable to put up organized resistance. Its artillery was unable to promptly open fire. The tank crews caught outside their vehicles were destroyed or fled. The enemy defensive zone was breeched almost without losses.

Also successful was a false attack conducted by specially assigned platoons 30 minutes before the end of the artillery softening up along the entire front of the 5th Guards Army of the First Ukrainian Front in the Vistula-Oder Operation. The enemy considered the false actions as an attack by the main forces, it moved up its troops for repelling it and as a result suffered great losses from artillery fire.(9)

The enemy was also stunned by the surprise employment of new weapons, the rocket artillery. By 1 July 1941, one rocket artillery battery had been formed with seven M-13 units. During the night of 2 July, this was dispatched to the Western Front. On 14 July, at 1530 hours, the first combat salvo against a group of Nazis in Orsha in the area of the railroad station caused the enemy great losses and spread panic among the troops.(10) The rocket units which were affectionately called "Katyushas" by our troops fought the entire war. Experience showed that they achieved the greatest results when they were used by surprise and on a massed basis, on the major sectors.

"Under these conditions, surprise salvo fire achieved a great damaging and moral effect. With the loss of surprise, the enemy was able to take shelter and the effect of the fire dropped."(11)

Surprise was achieved by **stratagem, the enterprise and resourcefulness of the commanders, their boldness and initiative.** In the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, the commander of the XXVI Tank Corps learned that a bridge over the Don survived in the town of Kalach. For capturing the bridge and supporting the crossing of the main forces, he sent out a forward detachment under the command of the commander of the 14th Motorized Rifle Brigade, Lt Col G. N. Filippov.(12) Under the cover of darkness, the detachment joined up with one of the enemy columns and, in traveling as part of it with headlights on, by dawn of 22 November, reached the bridge. As soon as the first vehicles reached the opposite bank, upon the agreed-upon signal, the men by surprise opened fire and destroyed the security subunit. The forward detachment quickly took up all-round defense and, repelling the Nazi attacks to recover the lost bridge, supported the crossing of the arriving corps units.

Surprise was often achieved by **carrying out a concealed maneuver in rugged terrain.** Such a method of fighting was possible under the condition of the great physical endurance and military skill of the personnel. An example of this was the actions of our units in the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation (October 1944). Solid bogs and swamps lay in front of the axis of the CXXVI Light Rifle Corps. The enemy did not doubt their impassability and for this reason did not create any defensive lines in this sector. But our soldiers crossed here, each man carrying all necessary supplies. The average load per man reached 40 kg. In moving at times through water up to their chest, the Soviet troops showed great tenacity and unbending will for victory. Having made a 70-km march under these conditions, they outflanked the enemy and cut the major road for it of Luostari--Ahmalahti--Nikel. The appearance of our troops in this area was a complete surprise for the enemy. In a panic they abandoned the heavy weapons and quickly retreated.(13)

On another sector the subunits and units built column tracks where no one had ever crossed. The soldiers walked knee-deep through the water pulling their combat equipment behind them. Even the amphibious vehicles could not move on their own here, becoming stuck in the still unfrozen swamps and in the ice-covered lakes. Regardless of all such difficulties, in 3 days the men crossed previously never negotiated areas of tundra and in two places cut the Petsamo--Rovaniemi Highway confirming the Suvorov statement: The Russian soldier can go where the reindeer goes and where the reindeer has not gone, the Russian soldier will still go.

The moral confusion in the enemy caused by surprise had time limits. It was strongest initially and later the enemy regained combat capability and the capacity to fight actively. In line with this **the results of the surprise had to be used as quickly as possible and as completely as possible** at the earliest stage, the achieved success had to be exploited, preventing the enemy from recovering and returning to the former state. Here in the forefront were such qualities as the professional preparedness of the commanders, their ability to take the most effective decision, the readiness of the staffs to

organize and support its execution and the ability of the men to fight under terrain conditions, at any time of the year or day.

The achieving of surprise in actions on the battlefields of the Great Patriotic War was one of the indicators of the superiority of Soviet military art over the military art of the Nazi Army. "...The Soviet Armed forces," wrote MSU G. K. Zhukov in his memoirs, "learned to keep secret its intentions, to carry out disinformation widely and confuse the enemy. The concealed regroupings and concentrations made it possible to launch surprise attacks against the enemy."(14)

FOOTNOTES

1. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 136, inv. 1494, file 63, sheet 263.
2. Quoted in: G. K. Zhukov, "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya" [Memoirs and Reflections], Moscow, Izd-vo APN, 1970, p 419.
3. See: VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 10, 1967, p 45.
4. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voyenizdat, Vol 7, 1976, pp 254, 255.
5. V. I. Chuykov, "Gvardeytsy Stalingrada idut na Zapad" [The Guardsmen of Stalingrad Move West], Moscow, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1972, pp 119-122.
6. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, Voyenizdat, Vol 2, 1976, p 162.
7. Ibid., p 496.
8. "Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voynе 1941-1945" [Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow, Voyenizdat, Vol 3, 1958, p 624.
9. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya," Vol 2, p 162.
10. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 11, 1975, p 13.
11. A. I. Nesterenko, "Ogon vedut 'katyushi'" [The "Katyushas" Are Firing], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1975, p 44.
12. "Geroi Sovetskogo Soyuza. Istoriko-statisticheskiy ocherk" [Heroes of the Soviet Union. Historical-Statistical Essay], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1984, p 67.
13. "Osvoboditelnaya missiya Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil vo vtoroy mirovoy voynе" [The Liberating Mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in World War II], Moscow, Politizdat, 1971, p 259.

14. G. K. Zhukov, op. cit., p 418.

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10272

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TORPEDO BOAT OPERATIONS TO DISRUPT ENEMY SEA MOVEMENTS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 85 pp 31-36

[Article by Candidate of Naval Sciences, Docent, Capt 1st Rank A. N. Zamchalov; the article was written from the experience of the Great Patriotic War]

[Text] Combat on the sealanes was the most widespread type of combat operations by our navy in which torpedo boats (TKA) were most frequently employed. In actuality the TKA were the main class of surface vessels involved in **disrupting enemy sea movements**. Around 90 percent of the combat sorties by Navy surface vessels went to carrying out this mission.(1) In the interests of carrying out this mission they conducted reconnaissance and sweeps on the sealanes, they attacked convoys and individual transports at sea, they launched attacks against convoy formation points and destinations and laid offensive minefields.

By the start of the war, the fleets had two types of boats. The small G-5 duraluminum boats of different series were designed for coastal operations and had a range of 230 miles. They were equipped with two 533-mm torpedo racks and two large-caliber machine guns and could reach a speed of up to 50 knots. The large D-3 wooden boats with a range of 500 miles were designed for fighting in areas more distant from the home bases. Their weapons included two 533-mm side torpedo tubes and two large-caliber machine guns and had a speed of up to 32 knots. Both types of boats could take depth charges.

In the course of the war, the Navy received new types of boats. Thus, large TKA of the A-2 class participated in the combat of the Northern, Black Sea and Pacific Fleets. During the final battles on the Baltic Sea, the boats of the "Komsomolets" class proved effective. The Soviet TKA, in comparison with the foreign ones, had greater maneuverability and low-noise engines. The relatively low sides and superstructures provided significant concealment for them.

During the first years of the war, the most widespread were **independent operations by individual boats or tactical groups of small size** (two-four TKA), as a rule, under conditions of low visibility on the coastal sealanes. Without having radars, they could count only on a random encounter with an enemy convoy. Air reconnaissance, particularly at the outset of the war, was

not carried out systematically in the interests of the torpedo boats and its data did not always correspond to reality. The methods of torpedo boat operations to disrupt enemy sea movements were also influenced by the conditions of the various naval theaters and the developing situation in the fleets. For example, in the Northern Fleet, right up until the spring of 1944, that is, until the time a TKA brigade was organized, the boats operated by the ambush method. In those instances when the enemy bases were a great distance away, the need arose to increase the boat range. Instead of the active search for convoys, the boats waited for them on the shipping lanes. The torpedo boats of the Black Sea Fleet operated in a similar manner on the enemy sealanes of Yalta--Feodosiya--Kerch in 1943. Due to the great length of the sealanes, the boats had to set to sea with one torpedo and instead of carrying a second took on additional fuel supplies. This reduced the combat capabilities and activity of the boats and restricted their maneuvering.

The "ambush" method consisted in having the boats in darkness take up good positions on the approaches to ports and there they drifted awaiting the approach of enemy transports. Sometimes the boats were unable to launch an attack although targets were spotted. The problem was that the range of visual detection did not exceed, as a rule, 40 cable lengths and it happened that the launches were ready only when the enemy vessels had either entered the port or had left an area convenient for torpedo attack.

On the Baltic in 1945 the "blockade patrol" method was widely and effectively used during the blockade actions of the naval forces aimed against the enemy's supplying of its Kurland and Zemland groupings. Air reconnaissance was provided in the interests of the TKA sent out on blockade patrols and sometimes an air cover was organized. The activeness and results of the blockade actions by the Baltic Fleet, including the torpedo boats, forced the enemy command to abandon the use of the coastal areas for sea shipments.

In the torpedo boat operations the method of "free search" ("free hunting") was also employed. Preference was given to this method in the Northern Fleet, for example, up to the end of 1943. The torpedo boats operating on the enemy sealanes in Varangerfjord employed it in 63 instances out of 80.(2) It was used most frequently by tactical groups consisting of two TKA. Considering the physicogeographic features of the theater and the nature of the sealanes, the group commanders chose courses in immediate proximity to the shore, following along the designated sector of the channel. In the interests of concealment, the boats strictly observed radio silence, they turned on noise suppressors and operated on just one engine. After detecting targets, they closed in on them to a short distance and then, putting on speed, carried out the torpedo attack. Good results were achieved by search and attack from the side of the enemy-occupied shore. Enemy convoys were easier to detect against the background of the horizon than against the background of rocks. Moreover, the security for the transports in the convoys was weaker on the shore side. The boats went into the attack, as a rule, from one direction, using one or two torpedoes. A post-launch maneuver was carried out after the torpedoes were launched. This was aimed at breaking off from pursuit as quickly as possible and escaping beyond the range of shore batteries. Regardless of a number of successful attacks, as a whole the effectiveness of such TKA operations remained low. Of the 63 group sorties for "free search," they had

only 5 encounters with the enemy and this was less than 8 percent of the total number.(3)

The torpedo boats during this period, without having a dependable air cover, operated largely at night or under conditions of limited visibility. In daylight attacks, as occurred rather rarely, they were covered by a smokescreen. This provided an opportunity to launch the torpedo attack from a short distance (not more than 6-9 cable lengths) as well as break away from the enemy after the attack. For setting the smokescreen one of the group boats was assigned, usually the fastest.

During the third period of the Great Patriotic War the TKA operated with particular effectiveness. It was precisely then that the tactics of their combat employment gained the greatest development. This was aided by the following: the overall strategic situation which had altered in favor of the Soviet Armed Forces on the Soviet-German Front and the operational situation on the sea theaters; the winning of air supremacy by our aviation; the change in the number and quality of the torpedo boat forces and the gaining of combat experience by their personnel.

During this period the intensity of torpedo weapon employment increased significantly. There was an increased number of sorties by torpedo boats on the enemy sealanes using the data of air reconnaissance, although preference still remained with independent operations (the "free hunting" method). The search for enemy convoys was carried out by several groups simultaneously (two-four groups of two-four boats in each). These began to include boats equipped with radars. This significantly increased the probability of detecting the enemy, particularly under the conditions of poor visibility. Reciprocal guidance among the groups was widely employed. The detection of targets and the guidance of the torpedo boats to them under nighttime conditions were provided by aircraft using illuminating bombs.

There were more frequent massed attacks on convoys by torpedo boat formations. An example of this method of operations would be the simultaneous attack on an enemy convoy by several TKA groups on 19 August 1944 in the area of Cape Kibergnes. Characteristic of this battle were: surprise and the quick pace of reaching the target; the attack on the convoy to the entire depth of its formation by TKA groups from different directions and at short intervals of time; continuous control provided from the shore command post and well organized cooperation between the individual groups of boats; the intense use of smokescreens; the early and successful setting of mines on the convoy's route which reduced its speed and impeded the maneuvering of the enemy transports and escort vessels. At the same time there were instances of individual commander's diverting from the demands of observing the principle of keeping in pairs and the rules for using radio contact.

Instructive also was the massed use of TKA by the Black Sea Fleet command in the course of the Crimean Strategic Offensive Operation. The torpedo boats usually operated in darkness in small groups (two-three boats) in areas (quadrants) specially assigned to them. Within these the boat groups carried out independent search. The group which detected an enemy convoy went into an attack, simultaneously radioing to the other groups which were in other

quadrants in the aim of organizing repeat attacks. The attack group included as escort ships gunboats (AKA), that is, torpedo boats equipped with rocket launchers. In the course of the torpedo attack they tied down the escort vessels of the enemy convoys.(4) In certain instances the TKA operations were supported by illuminating aircraft.

More and more frequently the torpedo boats attacked the enemy on its sealanes in daylight hours. This became possible due to the closer cooperation of the TKA with aviation. In a majority of instances success was aided by the choice of the time and place of the attack which was unexpected for the enemy. Great results were also achieved by the launching of torpedoes from two sides after the boats had cut through the convoy formation. Closing in on the targets was carried out at full speed and on a straight course. In the event of strong return fire, an antiartillery zigzag was carried out with an abrupt change in speed. The boats closed in on the targets in pairs from different directions simultaneously or with slight intervals, using smokescreens. Such a tactical procedure forced the enemy escort boats to disperse their fire and it was easier for the boats to break through to the convoy and close in to short distances. Here aviation carried out both support and independent missions.

A step forward in the development of tactics for employing naval forces on the enemy sealanes was the transition in 1944 to **joint actions by torpedo boats and aviation using reconnaissance and guidance data**. Some 1.5-2 hours prior to the sortie of the attack group, final tactical reconnaissance was carried out by the search and attack TKA groups. The obtained data were sent to the command post of the TKA brigade and through it were issued to the command of the attack group consisting of several tactical groups. Each of these which prior to the receiving of the guidance data had been traveling in a general wedge or rhombus formation, began tactical deployment. Closing with the objectives of the attack to the point of launching (as a rule, this was selected for target course angles close to 90 degrees and at ranges of three-four cable lengths) was carried out at a running speed up to 36 knots. In the first half of 1944, the most frequently used was the method of firing by direct aiming and in the second there was aimed fire with a fixed lead angle.

The joint operations of the torpedo boats with fighter and ground attack aviation against enemy sea shipments were rather effective. This forced the enemy to adopt special measures for supporting its sealanes in the Varangerfjord. The formations of the convoys were altered, their courses were adjusted, security was strengthened, the transports were additionally armed with antaboat and air defense weapons and so forth.

In operating on the enemy sealanes the torpedo boats operated closely with shore artillery. The TKA usually attacked a convoy when the escort vessels were within the range of shore batteries and were exposed to their intense shelling. This diverted the attention of the escort vessels and dissipated their forces. The firing of the shore artillery was halted or shifted upon request of the commander of the TKA group.

Particularly effective was the attack on an enemy convoy by the forces of the Northern Fleet on 28 June 1944. Involved in it were TKA groups, aviation and shore batteries. In less than a day of joint operations they sank 7

transports with a total tonnage of around 40,000 tons, a tanker, 2 minesweepers, 2 escort vessels and downed 30 enemy aircraft.(5) As a result of the successive combined attacks by the diverse naval forces, enemy sea shipments in this area were significantly reduced and the Port of Pechenga was completely sealed off until the end of 1944. The enemy began experiencing great difficulties in supplying its Lapland grouping as well as receiving such important strategic raw materials for Nazi Germany as nickel ore.

Torpedo boats were also employed in **raid operations** against enemy occupied ports and naval bases. For example, the Black Sea Fleet TKA attacked enemy ships and vessels in the roadsteads and directly in the ports of Yalta, Anapa and Kerch. On 13 May 1944, for example, boats under the command of Lts I. I. Stepanenko and P. M. Smirnov, in benefiting from the presence of fog, entered the Port of Anapa and destroyed a barge and several small vessels moored at a pier. The difficulty of executing such a mission was to cross the previously prepared and active antiship enemy defenses which included minefields, the firing of coastal artillery batteries, boat patrols and air observation and cover.

Preparations for the raids were carried out carefully and covertly. The moves to the enemy occupied ports were made at night with thrifty fuel consumption. Torpedo strikes against the objectives were also made in darkness or under conditions of limited visibility using surprise and executing a rapid post-launch maneuver.

The setting of offensive minefields was an important mission aimed at blocking and reducing enemy sea movements. In the course of carrying out this, torpedo boats were rather widely used. Their battle formation, as a rule, included a group or several groups of minelayers and one group of smokelayers, navigation support and cover. The mines were set in a bow-and-quarter line at a speed from 2-3 to 12 knots with a compulsory subsequent examination of the laying area for detecting the surfacing of the mines.

In the aim of influencing the enemy sealanes in the Gulf of Finland, the Command of the Baltic Fleet took a decision to carry out nighttime minelayings in the skerry areas using torpedo boats. Darkness provided concealment of carrying out the mission and did not require an air cover for the TKA. A tactical group consisting of four-six specially equipped boats, as a rule, made the mine settings. At the same time a unit of torpedo boats was assigned to carry out the mission of combat support. From June through November 1941, these made 99 sorties for active minelaying.(6)

In 1943, the staff of the torpedo boat brigade, in the interests of restricting enemy navigation in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland, specially organized two minelaying detachments from boats which had been reequipped as minelayers. One of these was based on Lavensari Island and the other at Kronshtadt. The detachments carried out most intense minelaying in May and June. The carrying out of this mission was sometimes executed with strong enemy resistance.

The Black Sea Fleet TKA used minelaying most intensely in the course of the Battle of the Caucasus. In the second half of 1943 alone, they set more than

600 mines and antisweep mines on the enemy sealanes in the Kerch Strait and off the Taman Peninsula.(7) These layings were carried out by the boats in large groups (from 10 to 27 TKA in each). In preparing for these particular attention was given to working out the practical skills of the navigators since certain boats were poorly equipped for navigation.

In the course of the war, **control over torpedo boat operations** was improved. The changes in its organization were most clearly manifested with the going over to their massed use independently and jointly with aviation. For example, in the Northern Fleet from May 1944, in combat the boats in the tactical group were under the control of its commander and he was on one of the boats. Most often this was the commander or chief of staff of the division. Characteristic of this period was the broad use of radio communications for the purposes of controlling the forces in combat. From the moment of establishing contact with the enemy and the start of the attack, when the giving away of the boats due to the use of radio communications was not of crucial significance, the group commander, as a rule, gave orders in open text. The brigade commander, due to the reports from the commanders of the boats and tactical groups could take prompt decisions. For increasing the range of radio communications, special boats were employed. Thus, in the combat during a raid by the TKA on Tanafjord on 27-28 October 1944, two such boats were sent out to the area of Cape Harbaken and this made it possible for the brigade commander to maintain constant radio contact over a distance of 120 miles and successfully control the forces.(8) A portion of the boats from the second half of 1944 was also armed with radar equipment. This made it possible for the commanders to more clearly perceive the picture of battle as well as promptly exchange information within the groups and between them, to provide mutual support and cover.

The improved organization of control over TKA operations was aided by the generalizing of the experience of their combat employment in the various fleets and by the elaboration of the corresponding directives and instructions.

Thus, the combat experience of the torpedo boats confirmed the correctness of the prewar views concerning their employment. The torpedo boats achieved the most significant results in operating on the enemy sealanes. They destroyed and damaged more than 250 enemy fighting ships and vessels with a total tonnage of over 260,000 tons.(9)

In the course of the war they continued improving the methods of the combat employment of the torpedo boats and their organizational structure. The development of tactics in the fight to disrupt enemy sea movements consisted in moving from the use of individual and small groups of boats to the employment of large-sized different-purpose tactical groups; from launching independent attacks to systematic cooperation with the other branches of naval forces and primarily fighter and ground attack aviation; from attacks from one side or one direction to attacks from several directions by pairs of boats simultaneously or successively with minimum time intervals.

FOOTNOTES

1. Some 2,658 TKA sorties in 2,960 sorties by all surface vessels not counting operations by the Pacific Fleet (see: TsVMA [Central Naval Archives], folio 10, file 17714, sheets 414-416).
2. TsVMA, folio 767, inv. 2, file 75, sheets 200, 201.
3. Ibid., sheet 201.
4. Ibid., folio 2, inv. 1, file 808, sheet 421.
5. A. V. Kuzmin, "V pribrezhnykh vodakh" [In Coastal Waters], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1967, p 99.
6. TsVMA, folio 27, file 33330, sheet 6.
7. Ibid., folio 2, inv. 1, file 809, sheet 471.
8. Ibid., folio 11, file 40099, sheets 381-386.
9. "Kursami doblesti i slavy. Boyevoy put torpednykh katerov Sovetskogo voyenno-Morskogo Flota" [By Courses of Valor and Glory. The Campaign Record of the Soviet Navy Torpedo Boats], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1975, p 23.

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10272

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FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF THE SOVIET ARMY REAR STAFF IN WORLD WAR II

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 85 pp 37-44

[Article by Doctor of Military Sciences, Prof, USSR State Prize Winner, Col Gen I. M. Golushko]

[Text] During the first months of the Great Patriotic War, prior to the reorganization of the rear services, a majority of the Soviet Army supply directorates was under the chiefs of the branches of troops and services while the main quartermaster, ambulance and veterinary directorates were under a deputy people's commissar of defense. The directorates for the organization of the rear and supply, military railroads and fuel supply were under the chief of the General Staff.

A definite separateness could be observed in the organization and, consequently, in the actions of the directorates and services related to the rear support sphere. As Army Gen A. V. Khrulev recalled, leadership over supply for the operational army prior to the war was organized according to the following academic system: "The General Staff figures the demand and issues a directive, the supply services under it dispatch everything required from them, while the commandant offices and the VOSO [Military Railroads] of the General Staff which are in charge of motor vehicle, railroad, water and air transport, deliver to the troops all types of required supplies. Such theoretical constructs were externally efficient."(1)

The shortcoming of this scheme was that the General Staff and the staffs of the fronts and armies, in generally planning for the operational configuration of the rear and logistical support for the troops, were unable to go into all details of supply and transport while the separate supply services operated, in essence, without proper coordination and did not coordinate their efforts with the staff and among themselves. The lack of unified leadership over the rear services told negatively on the clarity and promptness of rear support for the troops, particularly during the first months of the war.

It became obvious that the existing system for managing the rear did not conform to the conditions of waging a major modern war. Decisive measures were needed to improve leadership over the rear and ensure the centralizing of its control.

This was constantly sought by the Chief Quartermaster of the Soviet Army, Gen A. V. Khrulev who on 21 July 1941 simultaneously became the deputy people's commissar of defense. He clearly saw the shortcomings of the existing troop supply system and raised the question of centralizing the rear bodies before the chief of the General Staff and later before the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

A consequence of this was the introduction of the position of chief of the Soviet Army rear and the establishing of the Main Directorate of the Rear consisting of a staff, a directorate of the military railroads, a highway directorate and inspectorate. In addition to the Main Directorate of the Rear, the chief of the rear was fully in charge of the following directorates: main quartermaster, fuel supply, ambulance and veterinary.(2) The Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Lt Gen Intend Serv A. V. Khrulev was appointed the chief of the Soviet Army rear (he was also the chief of the Main Directorate of the Rear), and Gens M. V. Zakharov and P. A. Yermolin were his deputies; Gen P. V. Utkin was the chief of staff of the chief of the Soviet Army rear and Gens M. P. Milovskiy and P. I. Drachev were his deputies.

Initially the staff of the rear included the following sections: planning of logistical support for the operational troops and formations, the planning of rail and motor shipments, the organizing of the rear bodies and facilities, evacuation and a general section.(3)

From the very first days of its existence, the staff had to carry out great and complex tasks. It followed the operational-strategic and rear situation on the fronts; it prepared proposals and figures for logistical support of the troops and after the chief of the rear had taken his decision it planned the rear support of the operations and campaigns and issued these tasks to the fronts and separate armies; it kept records for the supply of the fronts and new operational formations with all types of material resources; it planned the transporting of materiel and supervised the fulfillment of these plans; it was concerned with organizational questions and the evacuation of materiel and various military property from threatened areas. The staff coordinated the activities of all the central supply and support directorates.

Over the entire war logistic support was the main thing in the work of the staff of the chief of the rear and within logistic support it was transport. A sense of its importance was voiced by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I. V. Stalin in February 1942 in appointing A. V. Khrulev simultaneously the people's commissar of the railroads. "...The supply of the fronts," he emphasized, "is primarily transport."(4)

During the period of the defensive engagements of 1941, the staff of the rear carried out many different measures to organize transport. An enlarged conference was held on the questions of systematizing the supply shipments. It was attended not only by representatives of the staff and DOSO but also the supply directorates of the NKO [People's Commissariat of Defense]: the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) and the Main Engineer Directorate (GIU), the Fuel Supply Directorate (USG) and others. The conference produced recommendations on organizing intermediate dumps on the main freight routes and for equipping

railroad shuttle trains and played a definite role in further improving the organization of transport.

Literally from the very first days of its existence, the staff of the rear employed the effective method of controlling the rear of sending operations groups and liaison officers directly into the operational army in order on the spot to study the situation and provide specific aid to the rear services in organizing their work in accord with the new requirements and the situation on the front. For example, on 5 August a group of staff officers traveled to the Kharkov area with the mission of organizing fuel supply for the 6th and 18th Armies of the Southern Front. The officers worked around 6 days in this area collecting supply transport and helping organize the motor vehicle subunits, they designated the depots and dumps from whence fuel could be taken and established transportable supplies in the units and subunits of these armies.

In the second half of August an operations group of officers from the staff and directorate of the rear headed the leadership and supervision for relieving the stations on the Moscow Ring Railroad and the entire Moscow Railroad Junction. As is known, during this time transports with various evacuation freight and unused materiel from the dumps were moving toward Moscow. Much so-called undocumented freight appeared. And moving toward the front, again through Moscow, were planned trains with troops and materiel. All of this had to be figured out and some freight turned over for supplying the fronts, other to the regulating stations and central dumps and some rerouted into the interior of the nation with the designating of specific recipients, while the planned transports should be sent more rapidly to the front. The officers from the staff and rear directorates worked intensely here for many days and carried out the mission. By September the Moscow Junction was unencumbered.

Frequently other railroad junctions became overloaded with trains carrying supply and evacuation freight. These represented easy targets for enemy aviation. The turn-around of the rolling stock declined sharply and empty cars were held up for a long time on the front railroads. In order to impose order, at the beginning of September 1941, the chief of the Soviet Army Rear began appointing representatives from among the staff officers to the main junctions, granting them great rights. Together with the representatives of the NKPS [People's Commissariat of Railroads] and the VOSO bodies, they took decisive measures to accelerate the movement and unloading of the troop trains, they minimized their rerouting and provided the greatest possible aid in organizing through trains for each front.

The staff of the chief of the rear, along with the VOSO bodies, at that time introduced a new numbering system for the transports making it possible to quickly determine the type of freight and destination of each transport. All of this helped to successfully handle the mass supply and evacuation movements.

It must be pointed out that the staff of the rear gradually became a fighting, effective headquarters body although there were definite inevitable flaws during the formative period. Instances were encountered of delay in the processing of documents, and there were frequent shifts of the personnel,

including the leadership. In September 1941, Gen M. P. Milovskiy became the chief of staff in the place of Gen P. V. Utkin who left for the operational army. With his assignment to the new position, he energetically set to improving the work methods and the coordination of the staff, he quickly won respect of fellow workers and authority among the leadership of the Soviet Army rear and established close professional ties with the central directorates of the NKO and the General Staff.

In the course of the Battle of Moscow, the rear staff under the leadership of Gen M. P. Milovskiy kept strict track of the supply of all types of materiel to the troops, it clearly planned their delivery to the fronts and prepared and issued to the troops directives on rear support for the fronts. Overall planning of the need for materiel, as is known, was provided by the General Staff in accord with the developing situation but the specific allocation of the planned resources and their delivery to the fronts, fleets and military districts were organized by the staff of the chief of the Soviet Army rear. He worked in close collaboration with the main and central supply and support directorates of the NKO.

In the activities of the central Soviet Army apparatus there developed a definite system of cooperation which proved effective over the entire war. The staff of the chief of the rear not only constantly guided the central supply directorates, particularly the GAU, concerning the location of the transports with freight, but also in accord with the decisions of Hq SHC and under orders of the General Staff announced the new formations and designated those railroad stations to which supplies must be delivered for them.(5)

The staff officers frequently visited the operational army for resolving questions of monitoring the organization of the rear, the supplies of the units and formations, the state of food for the personnel and the stockpiling of transportable supplies. Gen A. V. Khrulev also visited the operational army frequently. The chief of staff, Gen M. P. Milovskiy was often at the fronts and with his inherent energy helped in organizing the rear, transport and the supply of the units and formations with materiel. At the peak of the defensive engagements in the summer of 1942, he was present, for example, on the Voronezh and Bryansk Fronts. The trip provided an opportunity not only to become acquainted with the situation but also achieve greater organization in the work of the rear units and facilities of the fronts and armies and even make certain transfers of personnel.

Very responsible and difficult work was carried out by the Soviet Army rear in the defense of Leningrad. The city with a population of 3 million and with very limited supplies of food and fuel had been sealed off by the enemy. Air transports began to be used for delivering food products. Their operations were planned by the air shipments section of the staff of the chief of the rear. In September-December 1941, under bad weather conditions, 6,700 tons of emergency freight were delivered to Leningrad, while 29,600 skilled workers, engineers and technicians of the defense industry and more than 7,000 wounded were evacuated.(6) During the navigation season the water shipments across Lake Ladoga were constantly under the supervision of the officers and generals of the rear staff and directorates and during the winter the motor vehicle traffic over the ice route subsequently called the Lifeline.

In March 1942, when Gen A. V. Khrulev also became the people's commissar of the railroads, the staff of the rear was strengthened, chiefly its elements organizing transport and the Main Directorate of Food Supply and the Captured Equipment Service were established. In the place of dirt-road sections, military roads (VAD) were developed and so forth.

Of exceptionally great importance in the further improving of the rear support system was the decision of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the question of establishing a strictly centralized system of planning and responsibility for logistical support of the troops and transport. By the decree of the State Defense Committee [GKO] of 19 May 1942, the supply services (artillery weapons, motor vehicle-armored, engineer, signals and chemical weapons) for the questions of the overall organization of the rear, the planning of supply, transport and evacuation were put under the chief of the rear and deputy commander of the front (army) for the rear. Here responsibility for supplying the troops with all types of materiel as before rested on the corresponding chiefs of the branches of troops and services of the front (army).

The officers of the rear staff also worked intensely during the period of preparing and conducting the Stalingrad Operation. The staff of the rear and the chiefs of the central supply directorates during that period did significant work to stockpile materiel, to shift the supply depots and improve the operations of the railroads and all types of transport. However, for a number of reasons the stockpiling of materiel went on slowly. A group of officers from the rear staff and the central directorates headed by the First Deputy Chief of the Rear, Gen V. I. Vinogradov, quickly traveled through the field, conducted an inspection and established that the fuel and ammunition were being delivered late to the troops and the aviation rear services had not been completely assembled by the designated date. Considering this, Hq SHC put off the start of the counteroffensive by several days.

The chief of the rear and his staff, in following the instructions of Hq SHC, worked out a directive on the basing of the fronts and designated rear areas for them. Contrary to the then existing views, the front dumps were brought closer to the troops and located away from the railroads. But, regardless of all the efforts, by the start of the Stalingrad counteroffensive the materiel had not been brought up to the established standards on the fronts. Only due to their rational echeloning and effective use were the troop shock groupings dependably supplied with everything necessary. The essence of rational echeloning consisted in concentrating a maximum quantity of ammunition, fuel and other materiel in the troops and army rear with only a minimum of these remaining in the front dumps (for example, just 0.2-0.5 units of fire of ammunition). (7)

In the course of the operation there was an intensified transporting of materiel. However, the drawing out of the land lines of communications did not make it possible to handle such a large amount of shipments. Then Hq SHC, at the request of the chief of the rear, assigned two air transport divisions which in the course of battle airlifted cargo, primarily ammunition and fuel, to the tank and mechanized formations. In order to prevent interruptions in the supply of the troops of the Stalingrad Front fighting in the area of Kalach, Karpovka, Krivomuzginskaya, upon instructions of the rear staff their

supply was organized at the beginning of December using supplies of the Don Front brought to Kachalino Station.

In the spring of 1943, many staff officers, upon the assignment of the chief of the rear, visited the operational army for inspecting the state of the rear and the supply of materiel for the troops. Gen Khrulev himself visited the Kalinin, Central and other fronts. The materials from the trips by the generals and staff officers of the rear showed that certain commanders in the course of successful offensive operations had paid little attention to the organization of their rear and to supervising its work. Having generalized these data, the staff of the Soviet Army rear worked out a special NKO order which set out a precise procedure for troop logistical support. A draft of the order was reported to I. V. Stalin. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief, realizing the importance of troop logistical support, carefully examined the document, made a number of essential corrections to it and on 31 May signed it. In particular, in the order part of the document, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief wrote: "The commanders of the fronts and armies are to promptly set the missions for the chiefs of the rear in terms of logistical support for the forthcoming operations and provide instructions and the necessary data."(8)

The increased amount of materiel used by the troops in the operations required a further improvement in the transport system. According to the provisions existing prior to this, the formations and units themselves delivered the materiel assigned to them from the superior-level dumps. But in the course of an offensive the army and formation dumps fell behind and the inferior element could not handle the transport. The GKO, at the request of the rear staff, in June 1943, approved a decree according to which responsibility for the transporting of all types of supplies to the inferior field forces, formations and units rested on the senior chief of the rear.

The events of the Great Patriotic War also showed that the functions of the staff of the chief of the rear were significantly broader than were envisaged in establishing it. The new tasks dictated the necessity of improving both the organizational structure of the staff as well as the methods of its work. In June 1943, the GKO approved yet another important decree on the abolishing of the Main Directorate of the Soviet Army Rear. The directorates which comprised it were put directly under the chief of the rear. The position of A. V. Khrulev began to be called the chief of the Soviet Army rear and deputy people's commissar of defense for the rear. The chief of the rear staff became his first deputy.

After this reorganization in the staff of the rear, there began to function the following sections: operational rear, organizational, logistical accounting for new formations, planning and accounting of rail shipments, planning of motor vehicle and air shipments, a special group for the transporting of imported freight, administrative-housekeeping and other departments. The new structure of the staff and as a whole of the central apparatus of the Soviet Army rear, the functions and the legal status of the rear officials now made it possible to carry out the tasks of troop rear support more effectively and in an organized manner.

An important question in the successful solving of various questions of rear support for the troops and naval forces was the simultaneous planning and issuing of missions to executors, reducing correspondence with the directorates and the effective resolving of arising problems. For planning the rear support of forthcoming operations, they began to involve not only the staff of the rear but also individual specialists from the main directorates. Directives for the rear were sent out to the fronts and the fleets, as a rule, with the moving of the rear boundaries and the designating of new regulating stations. These were worked out in the staff of the rear, approved by the General Staff and issued to the fronts, as a rule, over the signature of the chief of the General Staff and the chief of the rear. These directives designated the boundaries of the rear areas, the front regulating stations, the railroad sections assigned to the fronts, the routes and times for establishing the military roads of the Center, the procedure for locating the front rear units on the territory of the rear areas of adjacent fronts, the logistical support procedures for the assigned or transferred troops and the dates the front rears were to be ready. When necessary orders were issued on individual questions of rear support. All of this helped to increase the effectiveness of command of the rear and told positively on its work in preparing subsequent operations.

In the course of preparing for the Kursk Battle, the staff of the rear, on the basis of instructions from the General Staff, worked out a plan for troop rear support. It supervised the construction for the Voronezh Front of the new railway spur of Staryy Oskol--Rzhava and preparations of dirt roads; the operation of the motor transport units; the supply of the personnel with new summer uniforms, good food and medical services. The following data showed the scope of the work done by the rear staff. In the area of the Kursk Salient, during the period from March through April 1943, the rear staff and the VOSO bodies handled 141,354 cars of just supply freight, including: 33,668 cars for the Central Front, 31,948 for the Voronezh, 18,359 for the Steppe, 25,905 for the Southwestern, 21,106 for the Bryansk and 10,368 for the Western.(9)

The rear staff in the new organization successfully handled the planning and organizing of rear support in all subsequent operations.

The rear staff assumed new functions with the entry of Soviet troops into the territory of neighboring states. This was first of all the establishing of transloading bases at the line of the state frontier, at the points of transferring from Soviet to Western European railroad gauge, the organizing and supervising of the rapid reloading at them of supplies traveling to the fronts, the rebuilding and securing of lines of communications on liberated territory in the Western countries and the extensive maneuvering of materiel and major forces of the rear forces and institutions.

Such a maneuver was carried out, for example, at the end of the Vistula-Oder Operation with the reaching of the Oder by the troops. Then the Commander of the First Belorussian Front, MSU G. K. Zhukov, rapidly regrouped four all-arms armies and two tank armies to Eastern Pomerania. Of course, the rear of these armies did not possess such mobility as the troops did and fell behind them. Only the presence in the reserve of Hq SHC and the rear of the front of motor

vehicle, medical, road and other rear units and their prompt maneuvering made it possible to supply these armies with everything essential on the new sector. The staff of the rear and the central directorates then planned and in 5 days delivered by motor transport more than 7,000 tons of ammunition alone to the right wing of the front. In a short period of time the medical service set up hospitals here with 15,000 beds. The rail transports from the southern sectors of Deblin, Lodz were quickly reassigned to the right wing of the front.

The rear staff and services did significant work in the Berlin and other operations in the concluding period of the war as well as in carrying out the assignments of the Communist Party and the Soviet government in providing aid to the population of the countries liberated from Nazi occupation. For example, the inhabitants of Warsaw immediately after liberation received as a gift from the Soviet people 60,000 tons of grain and a large amount of fats and sugar.(10) Thousands of tons of grain, corn, sugar, oil and other products were dispatched in April 1945 to the municipal administration of Vienna. Large batches of weapons and food were delivered by various transport to Yugoslavia. Upon instructions of the rear staff and the VOSO bodies, trains carrying milk, potatoes and other food products were given a green light for the starving population of Berlin. All of this was carried out along with the planned supply of the troops, the support and tending of repatriated citizens and prisoners of war, along with the aid which the Soviet Army rear continued to provide to our national economy.

In studying and analyzing the experience of the staff and the central directorates of the Soviet Army rear and the headquarters bodies of the front and army rears during the war years, it can be concluded that the new structure adopted in August 1941 for managing the rear, including the establishing of rear staffs at the center, in the fronts and armies, proved fully effective. The chiefs of the rear of the fronts and armies, in possessing full power, in fact were the full deputy commanders for the rear and the solely responsible individuals for all questions of the rear service.

Under present-day conditions, only a clear and firm centralization of command of the rear and the concentrating in one hands of the leadership over logistical, transport, road, medical and other types of rear support can bring success in carrying out the rear tasks in the course of military operations. One other conclusion is important: the rear staff justifies its purpose if its officers are constantly up on both the operational and troop rear, are regularly among the troops, if they study and analyze the system of rear support, draw correct conclusions and provide practical aid to the troops in improving this.

The experience of the war has shown that in the future the centralizing of the command of the rear of the Soviet Armed Forces must be improved and the principle strengthened of the responsibility of the superior command for complete, full and prompt rear support for the subordinate troops. Planning and other measures related to the organization of rear support for the troops and naval forces in operations cannot be carried out without close cooperation of the directorates and services which are both subordinate as well as not subordinate to the chief of the rear.

FOOTNOTES

1. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 6, 1961, p 65.
2. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 67, inv. 12018, file 147, sheets 1-10, 42.
3. Ibid., sheets 25-30.
4. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 6, 1961, p 81.
5. TsAMO, folio 67, inv. 12022, file 59, sheet 28.
6. Arkhiv Ministerstva grazhdanskoy aviatsii (MGA) SSSR [Archives of the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation (MGA)], folio 4, inv. 17, file 436, sheet 86.
7. "Tyl Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voynе 1941-1945 gg." [Rear of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1977, p 110.
8. TsAMO, folio 67, inv. 12018, file 119, sheets 24, 25, 27.
9. "Tyl Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh...," p 121.
10. IZVESTIYA, 2 February 1945.

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COL GEN UTKIN EXAMINES FRUNZE'S IDEAS ON LEADING ROLE OF PARTY

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[Article by Col Gen B. P. Utkin: "M. V. Frunze on Party Political Work in the Army and Navy"]

[Text] The diverse activities of Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze are writ large in the chronicle of glorious deeds by the unbending revolutionaries, the Leninist-type leaders and true generals of the people. Truly priceless is his military theoretical and military pedagogical heritage which in a profound scientific manner treats Lenin's ideas of the defense of the socialist fatherland and generalizes the experience of the Communist Party in the area of leading military construction and improving the system of party political work.

Applying fully to the activities of M. V. Frunze are the words of V. I. Lenin that only proletarian revolution for the first time gives to the previous individuals and heroes of the revolutionary struggle a true base, a true audience and a true army where they can manifest themselves.(1) Wholehearted service of the Bolshevik Party and the people and the strengthening of the might of the motherland and its armed defender, the Red Army, this is what comprised the purpose to the entire remarkable life and struggle of M. V. Frunze.

The force and persuasiveness of the military theoretical views of M. F. Frunze lie in the fact that they are based on the unshakable foundation of Marxism-Leninism and on a knowledge of the patterns and paths of social development. The problems of party political work hold a prominent place in the military theoretical heritage of M. V. Frunze.

In analyzing the sources of our victories in the Civil War years, M. V. Frunze had high regard for the role of the political bodies and party political work. In the greetings to the Political Directorate of the RVS [Revolutionary Military Council] he pointed out: "The role which political work has played in the successes of the Red Army is generally recognized. In it our army has gained a new weapon which to the greatest degree has strengthened and increased its combat might. Who has introduced the elements of order and discipline into the ranks of our young Red regiments which have been founded under the roar of cannon rounds? Who in hours of failure and defeat has

supported the courage and good cheer of the men and instilled new energy into their broken ranks? Who has established the army rear, implanted Soviet power there and created Soviet order, thereby supporting the rapid and successful advance of our armies?... This has been done by the political bodies of the army and it has been done, it must be said, brilliantly. Their accomplishments in the past are unprecedented. These accomplishments are completely tied to that role which they played in the general formation and in the system of our party political work."(2) In the treasurehouse of the very rich heritage of M. V. Frunze each commander and political worker will find examples and models for himself for the skillful indoctrination of the personnel.

M. V. Frunze was not only an outstanding military leader, organizer and theorist but also an unsurpassed, remarkable indoctrinator of the Red Army masses. He possessed that quality which is essential and rare for the leaders of the revolutionary struggle, a feeling for the masses. This feeling was manifested in all his activities. Frunze like no one else was able to link the military situation with the political. He was able also to win over not only the leading circles of the army but also the Red Army masses.

In his activities M. V. Frunze proceeded from the Leninist thesis that the foundation in the organizational development of the Red Army is leadership by the Communist Party. In speaking at a ceremony on the occasion of the 6th anniversary of the Red Army Military Academy, he said: "No one can organize and carry out his policy both in the nation and in the army outside the party and without it. As long as the party is strong and united the Union of Soviet Republics is undefeatable."(3)

In his daily activities M. V. Frunze devoted a great deal of attention to the political education of the soldiers and to indoctrinating them in a spirit of dedication to the new social and state system. He repeatedly pointed out that all the military should profoundly study Marxist-Leninist theory. Because of political indoctrination the soldiers and commanders better understand the historic purpose of the proletarian state's army and the role of the Communist Party in establishing the Soviet Armed Forces.

A study of the principles, methods and style of Leninist leadership was an organic part in the unified process of mastering the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism. A professional revolutionary, an active party worker and one of the founders of the new army, M. V. Frunze developed under the influence of the ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin. The uniting of the revolutionary ideas of Marxism with the worker movement and with the struggle to liberate the working class from the suppressors was a given for him and Frunze never forgot that he was the messenger of the party in the Red Army. In being guided by the teachings and instructions of the party, he was able to mobilize the will and energy of the men to carry out the missions confronting them. Mikhail Vasilyevich approached the solving of all questions primarily as a political worker, a Marxist-Leninist and revolutionary Bolshevik. From persons of the most diverse natures and habits, under his leadership a unified, powerful military organism was established which was the carrier of a single idea and united by a single will.

In defining the role of party political work in the army during the period of the victorious conclusion of the Civil War and in wars of the future, M. V. Frunze proceeded from the theses of Marxism-Leninism concerning the defense of the socialist revolution and the crucial role of the masses of people in achieving victory in a just war and the importance of the high morale of the people. "...All the strength of our Red Army, all its might," said M. V. Frunze, "has been based by us precisely on widely and deeply developed political education and indoctrination."(4) He constantly demanded from the commanders and superiors of all levels that they not lessen attention to our supplementary branch of arms which terrified any enemy.

The practice of the Communist Party's leadership over military organizational development and the combat activity of the army convincingly confirmed the vital necessity of introducing and developing in every possible way a system of party political work.

M. V. Frunze devoted particularly great importance to wartime political work. He saw in this the basic means by which the party would help the men more profoundly realize the just, liberating goals of a war of the Soviet people and instill in them intrepidity and steadfastness in combat.

In the development of the system of party political work and party construction in the Red Army, an exceptionally important role was played by the Eighth Party Congress held in March 1919. In the Party Program adopted at it, in the Resolution "On the Military Question" and in other decrees, the congress strengthened the underlying Leninist idea of unchallenged leadership by the Communist Party over the Armed Forces. It also approved the then existing structure of the party political apparatus in the army in the form of political bodies, military commissars and party organizations and set the task of further strengthening their role in carrying out party policy in the army and mobilizing the men to defeat the enemy.

As commander of the Armed Forces of the Ukraine and Crimea, M. V. Frunze demanded the involvement of the "best firm commissars" in fighting against the bands. "The political sections and party work in the troops must be organized in an exemplary manner."(5) Later on, in commenting on the accomplishments of the commissars, he emphasized that the institution of commissars in the general course of the Civil War had played an enormous role.

M. V. Frunze constantly carried out the party policy of promoting command personnel for the Red Army from among the workers, peasants and soldiers. He had a good understanding of people, he constantly sought out and promoted worthy commanders and superiors and when he was convinced of the correctness of the choice, had total confidence in them and supported them in every possible way.

The inspired Leninist instructions that the Red, Soviet officers should strengthen socialism in the army and that this would comprise the invincibility of the Red Army played a major role in our military organizational development.

M. V. Frunze gave particularly important significance to the mastery of Marxist-Leninist teachings by the command personnel. In his reports and articles he said that the commander should be able to organize work in such a manner that the masses see in him not only a technical leader but also an indoctrinator.

A special concern for the political bodies and commissars was the strengthening of the party cells and increasing the role of the communists in army life and in troop combat activity. In describing the role of the communists in the Civil War and the work of strengthening the party ranks in the Army and Navy, V. I. Lenin wrote: "How did we act in the most dangerous moments of the Civil War?

"We concentrated our finest party forces in the Red Army; we resorted to the mobilizing of our best workers; we turned to look for new forces where the deepest root of our dictatorship lay."(6)

By the end of the Civil War, over 300,000 communists were fighting in the ranks of the Red Army, almost one-half of all party members. Around 50,000 communists died a death of the brave in the battles for the motherland. Communists were in the vanguard of the fighters for the revolution, they led them into feats and united them under the banner of the friendship of peoples and proletarian internationalism.

With the transition of the Red Army to a peacetime status, many army communists were shifted to the labor front. In individual instances a situation developed which was fraught with the "splitting" of the military personnel and communists. During this period M. V. Frunze was against the attitude of eliminating the army and emphasized the urgent need for the further maintaining and strengthening of the military might of the Soviet state.

He wrote that the army was essential for us over the entire immediate period. And hence the clear importance of maintaining responsible military workers in it. In order to prevent the practice of "splitting" the communists of the Red Army and not allowing the weakening of communist indoctrination in it, which was what the Trotskyites sought, M. V. Frunze turned to the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee with proposals. These were discussed on 14 February 1921 at a joint session of the Politburo and Orgburo [Organizational Bureau] of the RKP(b) Central Committee. Having approved them, the RKP(b) Central Committee decided not only to halt the general demobilizing of communists from the army but also to return to the army all communists who had left it without sufficient grounds. These measures of the Central Committee were confirmed by the 10th RKP(b) Congress.

Along with strengthening the army party organizations, as a matter of particular concern, M. V. Frunze gave unflagging attention to the work of the political bodies. His enormous concern and attention to the political bodies can be seen from the fact that upon the initiative of M. V. Frunze as the commander of the Turkestan Front and V. V. Kuybyshev, as the member of the front RVS, in June 1920, a congress was held for the political workers of the

Turkestan Front. M. V. Frunze gave a report on the current moment at the congress.

M. F. Frunze devoted great attention to work with the youth. He frequently met with the soldiers, he spoke with them, he showed concern for their successes in study and service and was sensitive to their needs. M. V. Frunze was a desired guest at many Komsomol collectives of the nation. Thus, in June 1925, in speaking at a Komsomol conference, he said: "The closest ideological and organizational tie has existed between the Red Army and the Communist Youth League from its very first days. During the difficult years of the Civil War this tie was sanctified and strengthened by the blood of tens and hundreds of thousands of young workers and peasants who with weapons in hand confirmed the victory of the communist revolution."(7)

One of the most important conditions and sources of victories for the Red Army was that it arose and fought as an army of friendship of peoples. The revolutionary multinational masses fought as a single, equal multinational force. Workers of all nationalities without exception could join the army. Its ranks were closed only to the class alien, exploiting elements. The consistent realization of the principles of internationalism in the manning and development of the Red Army brought about the desired results. It became truly multinational.

In promoting the personnel of the Red commanders from among the people, the party strictly considered the nationality composition of the Red Army and the international nature of the defense of the socialist fatherland. Fighting shoulder to shoulder with the Russian military leaders S. M. Budennyy, K. Ye. Voroshilov, B. M. Shaposhnikov, S. S. Kamenev and A. I. Yegorov were the Ukrainians V. A. Antonov-Ovseyenko, A. Ya. Parkhomenko, N. A. Shchors and V. N. Bozhenko, the Latvians I. I. Vatsetis and Ya. F. Fabritsius, the Belorussian I. P. Uborevich, the Moldavian G. I. Kotovskiy, the Georgian V. I. Kikvidze, the Kazakh Amageldy Imanov, the Kalmyk O. I. Gorodovikov, the Chechen Aslambek Sheripov, the Dagestani Ulubi Buynakskiy, the Serb Oleko Dundic and many others. They themselves strengthened the fraternity in arms and united the fighters who differed in nationality but were the same in spirit and revolutionary aspiration.

The Great Patriotic War was a severe testing for the solidarity of the peoples in the multinational Soviet state and its Armed Forces. It demonstrated that the friendship of the Soviet peoples had become a source of strength, of combat might for the Army and Navy and mass heroism for the men of all the nations and nationalities.

During the period of the Civil War, daily, painstaking work in strengthening military discipline was a major task for the commanders, political workers and party organizations. This was due to the fact that vestiges of the past had remained in the awareness of a majority of the men. Military discipline and vigilance brought up to the highest limits were the task posed by the party.

The troops knew M. V. Frunze as an exacting commander who for the sake of the revolution could not tolerate laxness, negligence, a lack of discipline and

attempts at willfulness on the part of superiors of any rank. He worked out a number of demands which should be met by the command personnel.

In the strengthening of discipline, M. V. Frunze assigned a major role to the political workers. Well known is his statement on this question: "Our political worker, as a representative of the Communist Party, should always be the carrier of the idea of order and discipline which is most inherent precisely to the Communist Party. A political worker should be precisely that element which better, more dependably and strongly than anyone else assists in the strengthening of discipline and the reinforcing of internal and external order."(8)

In his works, M. V. Frunze showed the permanent importance of Lenin's theses concerning the fundamental distinction of highly aware Soviet military discipline from the discipline of bourgeois armies. Only the conscious fulfillment of the requirements of army life, the orders and instructions of the commanders and superiors, he pointed out, makes discipline truly iron. M. V. Frunze felt that on the fields of future engagements an army with high moral qualities and iron military discipline would be invincible.

Military propaganda was, in the opinion of M. V. Frunze, of great importance in increasing the awareness of the servicemen and their focus on the conscientious fulfillment of service duties. Even as the commander of the Armed Forces of the Ukraine and Crimea, he issued the order "On the Organization of Military Discipline in the Red Army and Navy Units in the Ukraine and Crimea" in which he proposed that all the political bodies should include military propaganda in the program of their activities. In accord with the order a large number of reports on special questions was given in the units and on the ships according to a program approved by M. F. Frunze.

At present, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations of the Armed Forces, considering historical experience, along with the commanders and staffs in every possible way are improving their activities and strengthening party influence on increasing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

Under the conditions of the growing real threat of war, the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government have shown truly Leninist restraint, firmness and principledness, in fighting steadily and successively for the preservation of peace and ensuring international security. The high vigilance of the Soviet people and the strengthening of national defense capability are opposing the intrigues of imperialism and the threats of aggressive forces.

The commanders and political bodies, the Army and Navy party organizations are doing everything to mobilize the communists and all the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces to properly celebrate the 27th CPSU Congress and to effectively carry out the tasks posed by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Minister of Defense in further increasing Army and Navy readiness to repel aggression.

Almost 60 years ago, M. V. Frunze prophetically stated: "If we must again defend the Soviet land with an armed fist, we will be opposed by a powerful and strong enemy. This obliges us to be fully armed with military knowledge

and combat readiness. Only unflagging attention, intense work and all-round studies will put the Red Army and Navy troops on the level of the necessary combat demands. Only such work will give us an opportunity at that moment when we are asked: 'Are you ready?' to calmly and confidently reply: 'Always ready!'."(9)

The ideas voiced by M. V. Frunze on the questions of party political work in the Army and Navy have a timely ring in our days. The commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol bodies widely use them in their practical work of indoctrinating the personnel of the troop collectives in a spirit of wholehearted dedication to the Soviet motherland and the Communist Party, the high moral qualities and feeling of responsibility for carrying out military duty, for maintaining the troops in a high degree of combat readiness and for strengthening military discipline.

FOOTNOTES

1. See: V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 38, p 75.
2. M. V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1984, pp 147-148.
3. Ibid., p 237.
4. Ibid., p 231.
5. TsGAOR USSR [Central State Archives of the October Revolution of the Ukraine], folio 2, file 167, sheets 333-334.
6. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 45, p 383.
7. M. V. Frunze, op. cit., p 472.
8. Ibid., p 390.
9. Ibid., p 321.

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10272
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SOVIET INTERNATIONAL AID IN FOUNDING, DEVELOPING SOCIALIST ARMIES

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 85 pp 58-62

[Article by Army Gen A. M. Mayorov, First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, published under the rubric "On the Establishing of Armies in the Socialist Countries"]

[Text] The CPSU and the Soviet government have consistently and unswervingly carried out the Marxist-Leninist ideas of proletarian internationalism. In our times these ideas are embodied and have undergone further development in the Warsaw Pact defensive organization. V. I. Lenin said that the peoples which have set out on the socialist path of development "without fail need a close military and economic union...."(1)

The strength of proletarian international solidarity among the peoples of the Soviet Union and the European socialist countries was vividly apparent during the years of World War II. The powerful blows launched by the Soviet Army against the Nazi invaders inspired the peoples suppressed by Nazism to fight for their national liberation. They saw in the Soviet Union a gigantic force capable of overthrowing hated Nazism and helping the peoples achieve liberation. They were not wrong in this.

The victory over Nazi Germany was a general victory of freedom-loving peoples and all the peoples of the anti-Hitler coalition, but the crucial contribution was made by the Soviet Union. The active involvement of the Soviet Armed Forces in liberating the states of Central and Southeastern Europe freed their peoples from Nazi suppression and significantly accelerated the end of the war in Europe.

The Soviet Union decisively supported the national liberation struggle of peoples and provided them with diverse aid. Over the years of the war with Soviet assistance, 19 infantry divisions, 5 artillery divisions and 5 air divisions, 6 infantry and airborne brigades, 8 tank and motorized rifle brigades, 5 combat engineer brigades, 12 artillery and mortar brigades and many other units were established, armed and trained. The total size of these formations by the end of the war reached 555,000 men.(2) For arming them the Soviet Union made available 16,500 guns and mortars, over 1,100 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts [SAU], more than 2,300 aircraft and other combat equipment.(3)

The Soviet Command provided great aid in the training of officers and specialists for the foreign units. In a number of the Soviet military schools, special training groups were established where Polish, Czechoslovak and Romanian servicemen underwent instruction. At the same time, on the basis of mutual agreement Soviet servicemen were sent to allied troop units. By the end of the war, for example, in the Polish Army there were around 19,000 Soviet generals and officers and more than 13,000 junior commanders and rank-and-file who were specialists from the technical troops. More than 900 Soviet generals and officers died a death of the brave fighting in the ranks of the Polish Army.

In the course of the war, combat cooperation was created between the Soviet Armed Forces and the people's armies of the Central and Southeast European countries. A major contribution to the struggle against the enemy was made by the heroic Yugoslav people and its People's Liberation Army. Fighting shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet Army on Soviet land and then in liberating their own countries and peoples were the Polish Army and the Czechoslovak Army. In the concluding stage of the war, the armies of Bulgaria and Romania as well as subunits and units of Hungary entered the struggle against the Nazis.

The Soviet Command had high regard for the combat of the allied troops on the Soviet-German Front. For the exemplary fulfillment of missions they were repeatedly commended in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Many formations and units were awarded honorific names of cities where they excelled in the battles for their liberation. The colors of 29 Polish formations and units, 10 Czechoslovak ones and the Romanian Tudor Vladimirescu Division were awarded Soviet combat orders.(5)

Granting the patriots in a number of European nations the possibility of fighting against the Nazi invaders as part of their own national formations was an act of international aid on the part of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces. The organizing, equipping and arming as well as the combat training of foreign military units and formations on Soviet territory during the war years were viewed by the Soviet Command as the fulfillment of an international duty.

The combat cooperation of the Soviet Armed Forces with the fraternal anti-Nazi armies of Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries in the course of the war was a natural phenomenon. It derived from the liberation nature of the struggle, the common goals of the peoples and the principles of internationalism. The combat cooperation of the allied armies was based upon mutual trust, a respect for national traditions and the greatest possible support in the course of joint combat. Fraternity in arms was forever strengthened by the blood of the courageous sons of the freedom-loving peoples shed in the fight against the common enemy.

In postwar times the combat alliance of the fraternal peoples setting out on the path to build socialism has continued to develop and grow stronger. During the first postwar decade, the uniting of the economic and military efforts of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries for fighting against possible imperialist aggression and their military-political

cooperation were carried out on a basis of the bilateral treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual aid.

The struggle of the working masses in the People's Democracies for revolutionary transformations in the political, economic, social and cultural areas occurred under the conditions of a fierce class struggle within these states and the continuous profound pressure and intervention into their internal affairs by the imperialist states, primarily the United States. The attempts of the reaction in a number of countries to use the national armies for carrying out counterrevolutionary coups acutely posed the question of the need to establish authentically popular armies dedicated to the ideals of revolution and socialism and capable of fighting wholeheartedly against the external and internal counterrevolutionary forces.

The CPSU and the Soviet socialist state showed a profound interest in reinforcing the results of World War II and in having the victories of the people's democratic and socialist revolutions in a number of European and Asian countries be preserved and strengthened in the interests of the ongoing movement of the world revolutionary process, the cause of peace and social progress. For this reason they aided in every possible way the development of the military-political collaboration of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces with the People's Democracies and their armies and provided all-round aid in successfully carrying out the military policy of the Marxist-Leninist parties and the People's Democracies.

The military and political collaboration developed in several areas. In the first place, the Soviet troops which were temporarily stationed on the territory of the nations liberated by them securely protected the People's Democracies particularly during the first postwar years against possible armed intervention by the imperialist powers.

Secondly, the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces provided all-round aid in establishing new type armies in these countries which would be truly popular and socialist. The Soviet Union supplied the People's Democracies with modern weapons and military equipment. In accord with the requests of the governments of these countries, the USSR also provided their armies with military advisors and specialists. They helped our fighting friends master the new Soviet military equipment, organize the development of the troops and naval forces as well as their combat and political training.

Thirdly, in the process of developing military-political collaboration, the bases were established for the collective defense of socialism against imperialist aggression, since the bilateral treaties on friendship, cooperation and mutual aid provided that the members of these treaties could consult amongst themselves on important international questions and when necessary provide military and other aid in the event of imperialist aggression.

Historical experience teaches that the military and political collaboration between the socialist countries and their armies is directly dependent upon the general state of relations between these countries and peoples and their

communist and workers parties. This process has followed certain definite patterns.

At the end of the 1940's and the beginning of the 1950's there was a further strengthening in the aggressiveness of imperialism and a uniting of the forces of international reaction. In 1949, under the aegis of the United States, the imperialist states founded the North Atlantic bloc (NATO). The imperialists intensified military preparations and the arms race. Under these conditions the need arose to elaborate a uniform program of actions and establish a dependable system of collective defense. The united forces of international imperialism headed by the United States were opposed by the might of the European socialist states which in 1955 concluded a Treaty on Friendship, Collaboration and Mutual Aid and thereby founded the Warsaw Pact Organization.

Our party, its Central Committee and the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee have given unflagging attention to strengthening the Warsaw Pact and this has proven to be a powerful and active peace-loving force playing an influential and beneficial role in European and generally international affairs.

The military and political collaboration of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces with the Warsaw Pact states and their armies is all-inclusive and encompasses a major range of problems in the area of the organizational development, technical equipping and training of the armed forces and improving the entire military organization system.

Of primary significance is the military-political collaboration of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces with the fraternal socialist countries and their armies on a bilateral basis and within the Warsaw Pact. At meetings and conferences the leaders from the socialist commonwealth states, relying on the Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army and the defense of the socialist fatherland, in drawing on rich experience, jointly analyze the processes of world development and the international military-political situation, they set plans for the future and determine further coordinated foreign policy actions and measures to strengthen defense capability.

In the aim of successfully countering the aggressive preparations of imperialism, the Warsaw Pact countries have focused military-political collaboration on ensuring the necessary combat might of their armed forces and their constant combat readiness to repel an aggressor's attack.

In the military-political relations of the USSR and its Armed Forces with the socialist countries and armies, military-technical and military-economic collaboration holds an important place. The powerful military-technical and military-economic potential which the USSR and the socialist commonwealth countries possess makes it possible for them to successfully carry out a unified military-technical policy and provide the Joint Armed Forces with everything necessary to carry out the responsible tasks confronting them. Naturally in carrying out all the tasks related to the technical equipping of the allied armies, the leading role is played by the Soviet Union which possesses great military-economic and scientific-technical potential. It

possesses the nuclear missile arsenal for the defensive coalition of socialist states, a mighty weapon for restraining imperialist aggression.

In accord with the changes occurring in technical equipment, collaboration is developing fruitfully among the allied armed forces in the area of improving their organizational structure considering the economic capabilities of each country, the balance of the branches of troops existing in the national armies and the nature of the possible theater of operations.

With each passing year, collaboration between the Soviet Armed Forces and the fraternal armies broadens and deepens in the area of operational and combat training. The allied socialist armies with the participation of Soviet troops and naval forces conduct joint operational-strategic and operational-tactical exercises. Here they test out combat readiness and the training of the commanders, the staffs and all the personnel, the forms and methods of command and the combat cooperation of the troops and naval forces are improved. The exercises help to further strengthen and develop fraternal friendship and indoctrinate the men in a spirit of patriotism and proletarian socialist internationalism.

The Soviet Armed Forces also collaborate actively with the armies of the socialist countries in the area of military scientific work. In the development of military science and military art, primary attention is paid to elaborating unified views on the nature and methods of conducting armed combat by the allied forces and fleets. All the Warsaw Pact armies endeavor to make as great a contribution as possible to the development of socialist military science. Here they creatively draw upon the achievements of Soviet military science, military art, the rich combat experience of the USSR Armed Forces and the experience of their combat and operational training, the training and indoctrination of the personnel.

The Warsaw Pact countries are paying great attention to the training of highly skilled officer personnel. Collaboration and mutual aid in this area are one of the directions of their military and political cooperation helping to strengthen the combat might and solidarity of the fraternal armies. At present, the officer personnel for the national armies are trained predominantly in the military schools of these countries, although at present the Soviet Armed Forces are continuing to provide significant aid in this matter.

The fraternal socialist countries are vitally interested in having the personnel of their armed forces possess great political awareness. They have been guided by the instructions of V. I. Lenin that "in any war victory is ultimately determined by the state of morale of those masses who shed their blood on the battlefield...an awareness by the masses of the goals and reasons of the war is of enormous significance and ensures victory."(6) Moving to the forefront are the questions of indoctrinating the men of the fraternal armies in a spirit of patriotism, socialist internationalism, immunity to hostile ideology, hate for the imperialist aggressors and a constant readiness to defend one's fatherland and the entire socialist commonwealth. This has caused a constant rise in the demands placed on party political work in the armed forces. For these reasons cooperation has been constantly developed

among the political bodies of the fraternal socialist armies and this is an important component part in the entire system of their military and political relations.

As a whole, the military and political collaboration of the USSR Armed Forces with the socialist commonwealth armies with each passing year grows broader and stronger and its effectiveness increases. It is our constant task to further improve the military and political cooperation within which the Warsaw Pact is an important instrument. "We will do everything within our power," as was pointed out at the extraordinary March (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "to broaden cooperation with the socialist states and to increase the role and influence of socialism in world affairs."(7)

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 40, p 46.
2. "Boevoy soyuz bratskikh armiy" [A Combat Alliance of Fraternal Armies], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1974, p 11.
3. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voyenizdat, Vol 12, 1982, p 255.
4. [Not in text]
5. "Armii stran Varshavskogo Dogovora. Spravochnik" [Armies of the Warsaw Pact Countries. A Reference], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1985, pp 109, 126, 179.
6. V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 41, p 121.
7. PRAVDA, 12 March 1985.

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10272
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MAJ GEN ANTONOV DISCUSSES OPERATIONS IN DONBASS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 10, Oct 85 pp 63-69

[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union, Maj Gen (Ret) V. S. Antonov, published under the rubric "Memoirs and Essays": "In the Battles on the Donets Land"; during the described period, Col Vladimir Semenovich Antonov was the commander of the 301st Rifle Division]

[Text] The operation to liberate the Donbass which was carried out in August-September 1943 by the Southwestern and Southern Fronts was one of the major operations on the Soviet-German Front. Our 301st Rifle Division also happened to be involved in the combat on the war-scorched Donets land.

We had been shifted to this sector of the front in order to reinforce the troops of the 5th Shock Army which had just held a strong enemy counterstrike and was continuing to develop the breakthrough of the enemy defensive line known under the name "Mius Front." The formation was to become part of the IX Red Banner Rifle Corps.

On 29 August, the division's units began unloading from trains at Pervozvanka and Dolzhanskaya Stations. The corps commander, Maj Gen I. P. Roslyy arrived to see us at Dolzhanskaya Station where the staff train was. He set the mission for the division to march to the assembly area for the offensive and then acquainted me with the situation on the front.

In cooperating with the 51st Army, the 5th Shock Army was to destroy Nazis in the area of Chistyakovo (Thorez), Debaltsevo, Krasnyy Luch, Snezhnoye. The IX Red Banner Rifle Corps which was the Headquarters Reserve was to become part of the 5th Shock Army (commander, Lt Gen V. D. Tsvetayev).

Having let me in on certain details of the commenced operation, the corps commander drove off.

The days were hot and windless, and the Donets Steppe greeted us with heat and dust. The regiments were making their way to the front across field roads and open country. Finally, we passed the stony passes at Dyakonov and reached the population point of Kuybyshev on the Mius River.

In the morning of 30 August, a liaison officer brought an order from which I learned that the 230th and 320th Rifle Divisions would advance in the first echelon of the corps. Our 301st Rifle Division was the corps second echelon. The divisions had been assigned the 140th Tank Brigade and the 485th Mortar Regiment which were to arrive in the concentration area on 31 August.

In the morning of 31 August, Maj Gen I. P. Roslyy conducted a reconnaissance with the divisional commanders. From a hill called Gora Sinyaya where we were there was a good view. To the west (over elev. 277.9 known as Saur-Mogila) there was a black column of smoke and dust looking like the eruption of a volcano. They were still fighting there....

The mission of our division was to capture a line of Alekseyevo-Orlovka, Serditoye and prevent Nazi counterattacks in the flank and rear of the IX Rifle Corps.(1)

During the night of 1 September, the division, having made a 100-km march in 2 days, had concentrated in the area of Bolshoye Meshkovo, Blagodatnoye, elev. 170.9.

The first echelon rifle divisions commenced the attack early in the morning. Then it was our turn. At 1300 hours, I received the order of the corps commander to commit the division to battle. I gave the signal and the 12,000-strong avalanche in battalions and company columns moved forward across the ravines and gullies reaching an area to the north of Blagodatnoye. The platoon columns split off from the company columns in short lines. I gave the command to open artillery fire. The platoon columns deployed into extended lines. Simultaneously, raising clouds of dust, the tank companies rushed forward. Deploying into a combat line, they began the offensive in the extended lines of the rifle regiments.

A loud "Hurrah!" rang out. The attackers had broken into the enemy trenches. The fierce clash lasted about an hour. The Nazis could not withstand the pressure of the rifle and tank battalions and began to retreat. The enemy defenses to the north of Blagodatnoye had been pierced. Having reported on the course of battle to Gen I. P. Roslyy, I requested permission to move closer to the battle formations of the regiments. The corps commander replied:

"I saw the division's attack. It is too early for congratulations but I want the continuation of the same fighting. Permission granted to move the observation post closer to the battle formations."

Having issued orders to the artillery commander to shift the firing positions of the 485th Mortar Regiment and the necessary orders to the chief of staff, Lt Col M. I. Safonov, a group of officers and I made our way to an elevation located a couple kilometers to the south of Prokhorov (Shishkov).

No sooner had we arrived at the new position when the forward command post of the division was attacked by a group of Nazi bombers. Strong explosions followed one after another shaking the earth. Fortunately, the bombing did

not cause any particular damage as everyone was alright and only a few had been stunned.

By the end of the day, the regiments had reached the line of the railroad and the outskirts of the settlements of Katyk and Serditoye. Here ran the switch position of the Nazis who had previously prepared the railroad embankment and the population points for the defensive. We had to adjust the combat missions for the units, shift the firing positions of the divisional artillery group and prepare for a new attack.

Toward evening the clouds moved in and rain began to fall. There was no question of help from aviation. The water-logged soil impeded the advance of the tanks, artillery and mortars. But time did not wait and we had to resume the attack before the onset of darkness. But the Nazis repulsed it. After intense artillery shelling the infantry and tanks resumed the attack. Now the extended lines of the rifle companies and the tanks broke into the enemy trenches and the settlement of Katyk....

By the onset of darkness, the 1052d Rifle Regiment had completely captured the settlement and mines Nos 14 and 31. The 1050th Rifle Regiment occupied the settlement of Alekseyevo-Orlovka and the 1054th the railroad station and the settlement of Serditoye.(2)

Late in the evening during my report to Gen I. P. Roslyy that the division had reached the line of the settlements of Alekseyevo-Orlovka, Serditoye and would go over to the defensive on this line, he said:

"Well, now I can congratulate you on your first successful combat on Donets land. I confirm your plan. The basic mission for tomorrow is to prevent the enemy from breaking through into the flank and rear of the corps."

The Soviet troops continued the offensive and on the following day liberated the town of Chistyakovo.

After their defeat on the first defensive line of their "Mius Front," the Nazi Command endeavored to halt the offensive by the Soviet troops on a line of Nikitovka, Gorlovka, Nizhnyaya Krynya, the Krynya River, Khartsyzsk, Mospino. This ran across hilly terrain with mine waste heaps and the swampy Krynya River. Here the Nazis had prepared a strong defense.

During the night of 4 September, our regiments prepared for a breakthrough. It was still completely dark when the 2d Rifle Battalion of the 1050th Rifle Regiment under the command of Capt F. Revin, unbeknownst for the enemy, forded the swampy floodplain of the Krynya River. At dawn the companies altogether attacked the enemy in the settlement of Nizhnyaya Krynya. Lt V. Smirnov bravely led the 5th Rifle Company into the attack. His company was the first to break into the settlement. In fierce hand-to-hand combat, Smirnov personally destroyed several Nazis. The commander died a death of the brave in the attack.

At 1700 hours by the settlement of Skelevatyy, the Nazis undertook a counterattack with large forces. The scouts counted around 20 tanks just in

the first line. The enemy counterattack was taken by the 1050th Rifle Regiment. The regiment commander, Maj F. Mitsul, seeing that the Nazis had assembled the women and children and were driving them ahead of the extended chains of their infantry, ordered them to hold their fire until his signal. The soldiers let the Nazis come up close then threw themselves into hand-to-hand combat and wiped out and dispersed the enemy.

The situation was significantly complicated when a large group of Nazi submachine gunners with tanks succeeded in driving deep into the battle formation of the regiment between two battalions and reach the western outskirts of the settlement of Nizhnyaya Krynska. Here they had just set up the regiment medical station. Upon the command of the senior physician, Capt Ya. Kiselev, the physicians and nurses armed with submachine guns set to fight. They were joined by several wounded. Among them was the machine gunner Sgt Nikolay Kolesnikov. Disregarding his pain, using a medium machine gun he flooded the Nazis with a sheaf of bullets. Having lost around 50 men killed, the enemy retreated.

The artillery troops also acted courageously. The commander of the artillery battery, Lt L. Fomenko, quickly moved the firing platoons up to the breakthrough area of the Nazi tanks and deployed them on an advantageous line. A volley resounded. Three tanks, engulfed in smoke, halted. The others continued forward, firing at the battery on the way. The severely wounded commander of one gun was knocked out. The battery commander himself was also wounded but he made his way to this gun and began to command the gun crew. Two other tanks were hit.

In another area, a company of antitank guns under Capt A. Kolosov was within close range of the armored giants. The wounded commander did not leave the battlefield. The Nazi tanks were forced to halt in front of the position of the courageous antitank gunners.

The situation became more difficult. I reported this to the corps commander and asked for air support. Soon thereafter the staff representative of the air army, Maj N. Sergeyev, arrived at the division's command post. It turned out that we had met once when students at the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze. Understandably, we immediately understood each other. My former classmate stated that the division was being supported by the 74th Ground Attack Regiment, the 1st Guards Ground Attack Division and covered by the 31st Fighter Regiment of the 6th Guards Fighter Division. We quickly planned the sorties of the squadrons and Sergeyev dispatched the call. Aircraft appeared 30 minutes later. Their accurate attacks halted the enemy counterattack.

However, regardless of the heavy fire by the entire divisional artillery group and the air strikes, the Nazis again were moving against our positions. From my command post I could see their battle formation stretching in a wedge. But the approach of columns from the rear could not be seen.... The plan grew to commit the divisional reserve to combat in order by a simultaneous attack of the 1052d and 1054th Rifle Regiments from different directions to surround and destroy the enemy which had "engaged" the 1050th Rifle Regiment in close combat. I gave the appropriate orders and the plan assumed the form of real combat for the division.

The 2d Rifle Battalion of the 1052d Rifle Regiment which was in the reserve, reinforced by two companies from the tank battalion of Maj Sadykov, began moving to the north of the settlement of Nizhnyaya Krynska. The hills concealed this maneuver from the enemy. Carrying salt troops on board, the tanks, with the remaining subunits behind them, quickly reached the flank and rear of the counterattacking enemy group. The commander of the assault party, Capt I. Golosnoy personally led his battalion into the attack. In this battle an enemy bullet took his life. The men avenged the death of their commander destroying hundreds of Nazis.

At the same time a tank party of the 1054th Rifle Regiment headed by Capt V. Zub surprised the other flank of the counterattacking enemy. Capt Zub was wounded but continued to command the battalion. Having discovered enemy tanks with infantry on their flanks and in the rear, the Nazi soldiers began to throw down their weapons trying to save themselves by flight. But there was nowhere to flee as our men and tanks were everywhere. No one escaped. Hundreds of Nazis and all the enemy equipment remained on the battlefield to the west of the settlement of Nizhnyaya Krynska.

The captured soldiers and officers were from the 3d Mountain Rifle Division. They related that their formation which was part of the IV Army Corps had been shifted here in order to take up the defensive and halt the offensive by the Soviet troops. However, the Nazi Command did not succeed in carrying out its plan.

Having driven off all the counterattacks, we continued the offensive. Our adjacent units on the right and left also moved forward successfully. In the morning of 5 September, the division was approaching Makeyevka along a broad front. For taking the city I decided to narrow the zone of advance, putting the 1052d Rifle Regiment on the right flank, the 1050th in the center and the 1054th on the left.

The regiments were preparing for the assault. Passing through the battle line were the terse words, like an order: "We will return Makeyevka to the motherland! Death to the Nazi invaders!" The chief of the political section, Col A. Koshkin, assembled the political workers at the command post, he instructed them and then sent them into the units and subunits.

We wanted to complete the preparations as quickly as possible in order to keep the enemy off balance. Little time remained and I had brief talks by radio with the regimental commanders on the regrouping in the course of combat. I informed the commander of the 1052d Rifle Regiment that the divisional reserve would be behind his battle formation on the exposed flank of the division. The tank companies of the 1st Tank Battalion of the 140th Tank Brigade were assigned by Col N. T. Petrenko and I to the rifle regiments.

The division's preparations for the attack were completed. At 1300 hours the assault on Makeyevka commenced. The first to break into the city were the 1st Rifle Company of Sr Lt F. Overchenko and the 6th Rifle Company of Lt A. Bocharov. A fierce street battle broke out. Here the fight was for every hours, block, street and even for a room in a house. Suddenly, a group of Nazis attacked the rifle platoon of Lt N. L. Shvarts from a nearby lane. An

exchange of fire, brief hand-to-hand combat and the enemy was destroyed. Lt Nikolay Shvarts died a death of the brave in this combat.

In the 1052d Rifle Regiment, the battalion of Maj V. Tushev was the first to enter the northern part of the city. Ahead was the 1st Rifle Company of Sr Lt P. Savchuk and in it the platoon of Jr Lt V. Ageyev.(3)

The other formations of our corps also fought successfully. But the units of the 301st Division did not reduce the rate of advance set at the very outset.

The 1054th Rifle Regiment, in conducting stubborn street battles in the southern part of Makeyevka, was moving forward. Here the submachine gunner company of Lt N. Kolomoyets, after an artillery intense shelling, occupied one of the street. The commander of the 2d Rifle Battalion, Capt M. Starostin, confidently led the men to the assault. The 4th Rifle Company of Sr Lt P. Kolesnikov had already spread out through the streets with the rifle platoon of Lt Ye. Yakovlev in front. Tall and strong, the machine gunner Vladimir Golovin in the extended line of the platoon showered the Nazi firing positions with lead, constantly supporting the attack of the rifle troops. An enemy bullet struck him in the chest. Bleeding, the Komsomol member continued firing.

The storming of the city continued. In the sector of the 1050th Regiment, enemy infantry and tanks went over to a counterattack. By this time, the tank troops of Maj Sadykov, having crossed the antitank ditch and the swampy stream, were rushing forward. Maj Mitsul committed the second echelon of the regiment, the 3d Rifle Battalion of Maj L. Motovichev, to battle. Along with the deputy battalion commander for political affairs, Capt N. Burba, and the staff officers, he himself led the attack. A fierce battle commenced. The Nazis wavered. The 1050th Rifle Regiment occupied the city center.(4)

By 1900 hours, the units had reached the western outskirts of Makeyevka. The fate of the city was decided. But the enemy did not accept this. On the morning of 6 September, enemy bombers appeared over the division's battle formations and the city. From the hill that was the waste dump of the Sofia Mine, where we had located our command post, we could clearly see around 40 tanks, including 10 "Tigers," advancing toward the northwestern outskirts of the city, to the positions of the 1052d Rifle Regiment. Another two score tanks were moving toward the center, against the 1050th Rifle Regiment. A large group of enemy tanks was also moving toward the southwest of Makeyevka, toward the battle formations of the 1054th Rifle Regiment and the adjacent 50th Guards Division. Assault guns were positioned in the tree plantings along the roads and in ravines, supporting the tank attack by firing from a halt. The enemy was moving up behind the tanks in extended lines of two or three waves.

Combat broke out again. I ordered the divisional artillery group to open barrage fire. I reported the start of the Nazi counterattack to Gen Roslyy and requested support from the corps artillery group. The corps commander informed me that he had already committed his second echelon, the 230th Rifle Division, to battle and the corps artillery group was supporting it. However,

having heard the data on the number of attacking "Tigers" in the area of our division, he said:

"Yes, your situation is truly tight. I will issue instructions to the artillery commander. There will be support."

This was truly a heavy fight against the enemy tanks! Only during the first day of the war on the frontier to the west of Kaunas and the city of Belyy in October 1941 had I seen so many Nazi tanks on a narrow sector of the front.

Having reassessed the situation, I decided to use my artillery antitank reserve, two batteries from the 507th Antitank Artillery Regiment. The other part of the artillery antitank reserve had been previously assigned to the 1054th Rifle Regiment.

As soon as the Nazi tanks approached our positions, the firing commenced. The gun of Sgt Viktor Voronov hit two tanks but itself was hit. Comrades came to help but when a "Tiger" appeared at the position, other guns simultaneously hit its sides. The tank caught fire. Three medium tanks and one "Tiger" engulfed in black smoke had been halted in front of the firing position of the platoon of Lt A. Denisyuk.

Five times during the day the Nazis undertook attacks with large forces. But each time unsuccessfully as the Nazi tanks did not get into Makeyevka. We counted six "Tigers" among the destroyed tanks.(5)

Having successfully repelled all the enemy counterattacks, the 5th Shock Army continued to develop the offensive on the axis of the Donbass capital, Stalino (Donetsk). The 301st Rifle Division received the mission of attacking it from the northeast.

The city which lay ahead of us was engulfed in fires and smoke. Teams of Nazi demolition troops and fire setters were already at work there, destroying and burning the buildings. The dormitories of the student compound and the classrooms of the industrial, medical and pedagogical institutes were afire. The House of Soviets was in flames. The Nazis felt that they would not be able to hold out here, and as had been done in Makeyevka previously, were in a rush to destroy everything.

The dark blanket of night rapidly descended on the hills and steppe. But this did not mean that a pause would ensue. As a rule, all the battles on the Donets land we either commenced or ended at night, using darkness as a good opportunity for the concealed regrouping and concentrating of forces and achieving surprise in launching attacks against the enemy. Experience suggested that before the routed enemy had recovered from the daytime counterattacks was the best time to attack. I issued orders to the regiments to advance. By a surprise attack the enemy was driven out of the trenches. The first echelon battalions quickly moved in where the explosions of the artillery shelling had just been and captured Novobutovka and Novochaykin.

As a result of the attack during the night of 7 September, the division not only caused significant harm to the enemy but also ensured conditions for

rushing directly into the city. The 1052d Rifle Regiment had reached the northeastern outskirts of Stalino. The 1050th Rifle Regiment had captured the settlements of Sotsgorodok, Rabochiy Gorodok and the strongpoint of the Mariya Mine and had reached the eastern outskirts of the city. The 1054th Rifle Regiment, having advanced to the south of the Makeyevka--Stalino Highway, was approaching the southeastern outskirts of the city. The 2d Tank Battalion of Maj Umantsev had taken up a jump-off line behind the 1054th Rifle Regiment. By 1000 hours, all the units had taken up the jump-off position on the line of the Kalmius River.

Since all three of our regiments were in the first echelon of the division and there was no time for a reorganization, I decided not to alter the battle formation, however I demanded that the regiment commanders have a strong reserve or assign one battalion each to a second echelon. I felt it wise to assign the 3d Tank Battalion by companies to the rifle regiments. Since the right wing of the division was exposed, a strong divisional reserve was established consisting of a separate motorized rifle battalion, the 1st Tank Battalion of the 140th Tank Brigade, two artillery batteries from the 507th Antitank Artillery Regiment. It was concentrated behind the right flank of the division to the west of the settlement of Sheglovka. Thus the attack against the northeastern outskirts of the city was prepared.

In the companies and battalions concentrated along the ravines and gullies in the jump-off position for the offensive, brief meetings were held at which the soldiers and officers angrily condemned the Nazi butchers and vowed to quickly liberate the miner capital. Many soldiers voiced their desire to enter combat as communists. In the 1052d Rifle Regiment alone, 26 applications to join the party were submitted and 100 for the Komsomol.(6)

On 7 September at 1400 hours, the regiment commanders reported their readiness for the attack. Artillery softening up commenced. The tanks moved forward in the infantry battle formations. Ground attack planes hung over the city. Red rockets cut through the skies. The attack commenced.

The rifle battalions and tanks were in front. The first echelon of the 1052d Rifle Regiment broke into the student compound. The battalion commander, Maj V. Tushev, erected the Red Banner on one of the buildings. The attack developed successfully. However, it soon became clear that on the right flank of the division, where the adjacent unit on the right, the 230th Rifle Division, was engaged in heavy fighting for Aleksandro-Grigoryevka, a gap had formed. The enemy used this and launched an attack.

The 3d Rifle Battalion of Maj P. Tsayuk was almost surrounded. The regiment commander reported that for reinforcing the right flank he had sent the submachine gunner company of Sr Lt V. Shabanov and one gun platoon of a regimental battery. At this moment the enemy infantry with tanks had already broken into the battle formations of the 3d Rifle Battalion. Close combat broke out. The artillery troops concentrated their fire against the tanks. The gun of Sgt Aleksandr Petrov hit two tanks. This somewhat dampened the ardor of the Nazis. The machine gunner company of V. Shabanov rushed up and attacked the Nazis without a pause. The Nazis were hesitant but still did not retreat. Then the gun platoon of the Komsomol member from the Donbass

Pavel Kharchenko struck the enemy. With accurate rounds the artillery hit another two tanks. Nevertheless, the Nazis continued the attack. On individual sectors hand-to-hand combat broke out. A group of enemy tanks rushed down on the submachine gunners. One of them was traveling right toward the company commander. The courageous communist officer let the tank approach to a short range and hit it with a string of grenades. Here the officer V. Shabanov perished, cut down by a Nazi bullet. The platoon commander, Lt V. Konozobka, gave the order: "Company, obey my command!" And the submachine gunners continued their heavy combat.

In this situation the deputy regiment commander Maj N. Shcherbakov showed exceptional courage and self-possession. He assembled the company of submachine gunners and the rifle battalion into a close group and under the cover of the fire of the artillery battery of Capt Vyalushin, carried out a successful counterattack.

The enemy pressure began to abate. The moment had come to commit the divisional reserve. By an attack toward the northeastern outskirts of Stalino, in cooperation with the 3d Rifle Battalion of the 1052d Rifle Regiment, it was to destroy the enemy. I issued the order. Thirty minutes passed. The divisional reserve concealed by the embankment came out in the enemy flank and rear and deploying into battle formation launched its attack. This was a successful maneuver which threatened the enemy with encirclement. The Nazis endeavored to save themselves by flight, leaving over 500 killed on the battlefield. In this battle Maj N. Shcherbakov was mortally wounded.

The 1050th Rifle Regiment was also heavily engaged. Its commander reported: "The 2d Rifle Battalion is repelling a heavy counterattack by enemy infantry and tanks. The fighting against the counterattacking enemy is going on successfully. But the battalion commander, Capt Revin, has been wounded. I request a replacement."

A replacement was quickly found. This was a staff officer from the division, the former commander of a submachine gunner battalion from the 84th Separate Naval Rifle Brigade, Capt N. Chesnokov.

On the southeastern outskirts of the city, the first to break through were the submachine gunner company of Lt I. Kolomoyets and the 3d Rifle Company from the 1054th Rifle Regiment of Capt F. Bochkov. Here the Nazis put up stubborn resistance, having counterattacked the 2d Rifle Battalion. The battalion commander M. Starostin skillfully organized the repelling of the enemy counterattack.

The stubborn fighting went on for 3 hours in the outskirts of Stalino. During this time the combat engineers had rebuilt two small bridges blown up by the Nazis. Over these the tank troops crossed to the western bank of the Kalmius River and joined the battle formations of the rifle regiments. As before, the division's main efforts were concentrated on the right flank. I ordered the divisional artillery group to commence intense shelling at 1650 hours. The regiments again rose to the attack and broke into the city. During this time the southeastern part of the city had been reached by regiments from the 50th Guards Rifle Division of the III Guards Rifle Corps and without a pause began

to storm the Nazi positions. The 230th Rifle Division from our corps broke into the northern part of the city.

Our 301st Rifle Division, in advancing together with the other formations of the 5th Shock Army, fought its way house by house, block by block. The Soviet soldiers, in using a grenade in some places and a submachine gun in others, in stubborn combat routed the Nazis in the city and captured it.

FOOTNOTES

1. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 333, inv. 4886, sheet 45.
2. Ibid., folio 1052 sp, inv. 496440, file 1, sheets 1-5; folio 1050 sp, inv. 496439, file 1, sheets 1-10; folio 1054 sp, inv. 496442, inv. 1, sheets 1-5.
3. Ibid., folio 1052 sp, inv. 496441, file 1, sheets 5-6.
4. Ibid., folio 1050 sp, inv. 496439, file 1, sheets 5-15.
5. Ibid., folio 301 sp, inv. 484195, file 1, sheets 1-10.
6. Ibid., folio 1052 sp, inv. 496440, file 1, sheets 1-10.

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METHODS OF ARTILLERY ATTACK SUPPORT IN WORLD WAR II OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

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[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Docent, Col V. A. Chernukhin]

[Text] In the offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War the conducting of one or another type of fire in the course of the artillery support for the attack depended upon the plan of the operation, the availability of artillery and ammunition, the nature of enemy defenses, the degree of its exposure, the terrain conditions and a number of other factors.

Under the conditions where Nazi defenses had a focal nature and the amount of artillery to be used for supporting the infantry and tank attack as well as the assignable limit of ammunition were slight, as a rule, only an unplanned concentrated fire was employed. Such a type of fire, naturally, did not ensure the guaranteed hitting of weapons and other objectives in the enemy defenses.

With the issuing of the Directive Letter of Hq SHC of 10 January 1942, with the mastery by the artillery commanders and staffs of the methods of organizing and providing continuous support for the advancing infantry and tanks, with the greater number and better quality of artillery, and with the improved means and methods of conducting artillery reconnaissance and observation, the successive concentration of fire (PSO) and a single rolling barrage began to be more and more widely introduced into troop combat practices. Thus, in November 1942, in surrounding the large Nazi troop grouping in the Stalingrad area, the successive concentration of fire was employed to the defensive depth of the first echelon battalions in virtually all the armies of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad Fronts fighting on the main sectors.(1) In the course of overcoming the enemy defenses based upon a system of strongpoints and centers of resistance, this method of artillery support for the attack was most effective. The basic drawback of the PSO method was the insignificant depth (200-250 m) for the simultaneous fire effect against the enemy targets (objectives). For this reason the enemy antitank weapons and machine guns located beyond its limits, deep in the defenses, were not hit and had an opportunity to fire at the attacking infantry and tanks, as the range of effective fire for the heavy weapons of the Nazi infantry was an average of 800 m, and the range of direct laying for the antitank guns was up to 1,000 m.(2) This shortcoming was felt

particularly in breaking through positional defenses with a developed system of trenches and communications trenches. For example, in breaking through similar defenses on the Mius River in August 1943, due to the low effectiveness of artillery support for the attack using the PSO method and other occurring shortcomings, troops from the 2d Guards Army on the first day of the operation had advanced only to the depth of the first echelon battalions. The attempt to break through enemy defenses on the Molochnaya River in September 1943 by the troops of the 2d Guards Army and 5th Shock Army was completely unsuccessful. In both these instances, using the trench system, the enemy personnel and weapons maneuvered along the front and in depth and with the start of artillery support put up strong fire resistance to the attacking troops.(3)

The change in the nature of enemy defenses, the significant increase in their strength as well as the greater density of our artillery on the breakthrough sectors predetermined the changeover to the broader use of the single rolling barrage for artillery support of the attack. This was employed for the first time in the Great Patriotic War on an operational scale on 10 January 1943 in the breakthrough sector of the 65th Army of the Don Front in eliminating the surrounded enemy grouping at Stalingrad, and from the summer of 1943, it became the basic method of artillery support for the attack. The rolling barrage was a solid fire curtain which was set successively on the designated main and intermediate lines in the aim of hitting and blinding the enemy directly in front of the attacking Soviet troops. Regardless of the substantial advantages of the single rolling barrage in comparison with the PSO, combat practice also disclosed a number of its negative aspects. First of all, it must be emphasized that a limited number of targets was exposed to the fire effect in setting the rolling barrage, while the enemy weapons which had a great range of effective fire and were positioned beyond the rolling barrage could fire at the advancing troops. It must also be pointed out that the calculated fire density established on its lines, as a consequence of various factors (the increased shell scatter, errors in setting the sight attachments and preparing the initial data for firing, the specific nature of the terrain and so forth) was rather substantially reduced. Finally, such a tactical demand on the artillery as increasing the depth of the simultaneous hitting of enemy defenses was not met. For this reason, the artillery commanders and staffs endeavor to find a more effective form of a rolling barrage. A positive solution to the given problem was furthered not only by the combat experience gained but also by the increased capabilities to involve a larger number of artillery for carrying out the tasks of artillery support for the attack. As a result of painstaking work on the First Belorussian Front, in the course of the Belorussian Operation they worked out and began using a qualitatively new method of artillery support for the attack, a double rolling barrage. During the Great Patriotic War, on an operational scale (to a defensive depth of the first echelon battalions, to 2 km), it was first employed in the Bobruysk Operation on 24 June 1944 on the breakthrough sectors of the 28th and 65th Armies.(4) Subsequently, right up until the end of the Great Patriotic War, the double rolling barrage was the most important basic method of artillery support for an attack during the offensive operations.

Two artillery groups were established for setting the double rolling barrage. The first fired successively at the main and intermediate lines, and the

second only at the main lines, starting with the second one. Both groups fired simultaneously. The fire of the first one destroyed and neutralized the personnel and weapons in the trenches, while the fire of the second one (in addition to this) ensured the destruction of the enemy observation system deep in the defenses and impeded the maneuvering of the nearby enemy reserves. When necessary, concentrated fire could be provided between the main lines against the most important enemy targets, particularly its antitank weapons. If the infantry was slow in going into the attack, there was also provision to delay fire on the forward defensive edge.

The control of artillery fire with the double rolling barrage was provided by the artillery commander of a rifle division using light signals (signal rockets) and which were duplicated by telephone. In order not to allow interruptions in firing, the following procedure was instituted. When the first artillery group halted fire against the line which the attacking subunits were approaching, the second continued firing against its line. The latter shifted fire after the first artillery group had opened fire against the given line. Fire was shifted from the intermediate lines at designated times.

In comparison with the PSO and single rolling barrage, with a double rolling barrage the firing at two lines substantially increased the reliability of fire damage to the enemy. The practice of employing the double rolling barrage showed that it created better conditions for the attack, since the zone of artillery fire some 200-400 m away from the attacking infantry and tanks covered an area up to 400-500 m in depth. As a result, the basic portion of enemy weapons (particularly the antitank ones) during the period the attacking troops came into the zone of their effective fire was exposed to the fire of our artillery.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, in certain offensive operations, depending upon the nature of enemy defenses, the available artillery and ammunition, climatic and other factors, there were also diverse varieties of the main methods of artillery support for the attack. In particular, in the 4th Guards Army and 53d Army of the Second Ukrainian Front, in the course of the Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy Operation, they used a so-called "growing" rolling barrage. In planning this to a depth of the first echelon battalions they designated two-three main lines which coincided with the trench lines. Intermediate lines were not designated. As the infantry and tanks advanced, there was a shifting of the fire curtain in depth in jumps of one or two sight lines. The "growth" in the fire density was achieved by increasing the amount of ammunition on each subsequent line (see the Table). Such a type of rolling barrage did not permit a great gap of the fire curtain from the attacking infantry and tanks and under the conditions of the spring mud this played a positive role.

A "quadruple" rolling barrage was realized on 3 November 1943 on the breakthrough sector of the LI Rifle Corps of the 38th Army on the First Ukrainian Front in the course of the Kiev Operation. Its essence is shown in Fig. 1. The high artillery density per kilometer of breakthrough sector (450 guns)(5) made it possible with the start of the attack to fire simultaneously against four main lines designated every 200 m (to a depth of the defenses of

the first echelon companies or 0.6 km). Guaranteed hitting of the defending enemy ahead of the front of the attacking infantry and tanks was ensured, on the one hand, by increasing the depth of the simultaneous fire effect against enemy personnel and weapons and, on the other, by increasing the fire density in shifting it to the subsequent lines of the rolling barrage. The spaces between the main lines were "raked" by the fire of individual batteries. As a result, on the first day of the operation the main defensive line was breeched and on a number of sectors our troops had wedged into the second line.(6)

Table

Distribution of Shells Fired at Each Line (per Weapon Unit) in the Process of Artillery Softening Up for the Attack by the Formations of the 4th Guards Army and 53d Army on 25 January 1944 in Carrying Out the Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy Operation*

Lines	Number of Shells by Caliber				Total
	82-mm	120-mm	76-mm	122-mm	
First	15	8	15	5	43
Second	20	12	21	7	60
Third	25	16	27	8	76

* "Sovetskaya artilleriya v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyni 1941-1945 gg." [Soviet Artillery in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], p 347.

The "creeping fire" method (see Fig. 2) was employed on the Leningrad Front, in particular on the breakthrough sectors of the 42d Army in the Krasnoye Selo--Ropsha Operation, by the 21st Army in the Vyborg Operation and by the 2d Shock Army in the Tallinn Operation. A characteristic feature of this method was that after the artillery softening up, with the start of the infantry attack, the artillery continued to fire at the targets in the near depth, including at the three or four trenches of the first position (with a depth of over 1,000 m), without reducing the rate of fire. With the approach of the attacking subunits to 150-200 m from the first trench, the artillery successively (starting with the large calibers and lastly the mortars) shifted fire from it and moved it directly to the second trench, if it was not more than 200 m away from the first. With a greater distance, artillery fire was shifted to the second trench across intermediate lines in jumps of two or three sight lines. On those areas of the first trench, where the infantry had still not reached a line of safe distance, the artillery continued firing at the first trench. As a result, it was possible to achieve a gradual moving of artillery fire and an increasing of its density as the infantry and tanks advanced in depth.(7) When the attacking infantry reached the last trench, all the artillery concentrated its fire against the enemy in it.

In this instance fire was shifted according to the requests of the commanders of the rifle regiments and battalions, as under the conditions of the forested terrain some battalions were held up and others moved forward more rapidly.




Fig. 1. Diagram of Artillery Support for an Attack by a "Quadruple" Rolling Barrage in the Breakthrough Sector of the LI Rifle Corps on 3 November 1943 in the Kiev Operation

The simultaneous shifting of fire along the entire area of the division would make it possible for the enemy to conduct flanking fire against the laggards. The control of artillery fire under these conditions was significantly more complex, as dependable and constant communications in the inferior elements was essential. This could not always be achieved in combat. A substantial shortcoming of the "creeping" method of fire was that with the start of the infantry attack artillery fire against the first trench was carried out with a lower density than against the remaining trenches. All of this limited the use of the designated method of artillery support for the attack. But the idea of increasing the depth of the simultaneous hitting of the enemy (firing immediately against three or four trenches to a depth of up to 1,000 m and more) before the infantry rushed into the attack, in our opinion, merits close attention.

An unusual variety of the rolling barrage was employed on 8 April 1944 by the 87th, 3d Guards, 126th and 315th Rifle Divisions of the 2d Guards Army in conducting the Crimean Offensive Operation. For conducting this they employed

chiefly mortars, and for this reason it was called a "mortar" rolling barrage.(8) In the zone of advance of the 3d Guards Rifle Division this was carried out against six main lines and five intermediate ones (to the depth of the defenses of the first echelon battalions). Two groups were involved in firing and these fired by leap-frogging: the first at the main lines and the second at the intermediate ones. Here the procedure was as follows. The first group fired at each main line for approximately 10 minutes (until the infantry's signal) while the second during this time was ready to open fire against the intermediate line and opened it at the moment the first group ceased firing. A third artillery group was established (the 192d Guards Cannon Regiment and the 331st Howitzer Regiment) and this supported the flanks of the rolling barrage by setting fixed barrage fire, that is, they formed an unique corridor for the attacking units and subunits. Fire for the NZO [fixed barrage fire] sections was opened up simultaneously with the opening of fire by the second group of mortars and artillery against the intermediate lines. On the third and sixth main lines, for blinding the enemy, companies of 82-mm mortars were specially assigned and these set a smokescreen with a density of six smoke shells per minute per mortar.(9)




Fig. 2. Schematic Diagram of Artillery Support for an Attack by "Creeping Fire"




Fig. 3. Diagram of Artillery Support With Successive Concentration of Fire Against Lines Employed on the Third Belorussian Front on 13 January 1945 in Conducting the East Prussian Operation

The East Prussian Operation in which our troops had to overcome a strongly developed enemy defense with fortified areas was characterized by the fact that on the breakthrough sectors of the 2d Guards Army and 28th Army of the Third Belorussian Front, artillery support for the attack was a variety of a PSO (see Fig. 3). Two artillery groups were employed for providing support for the infantry and tank attack using this method. The enemy defenses on the breakthrough sector was arbitrarily divided into several areas within which firing lines were set some 300-500 m apart. These were designated considering the actual positioning of the enemy targets and strongpoints as established by air reconnaissance and other reconnaissance means. The first line was 250-300 m behind the forward edge of the enemy defenses. With the start of the artillery support for the attack, fire was opened against targets positioned

on the first two lines. Here the targets of the first line were neutralized by intense shelling and those of the second by battery fire. The targets which were in the area between the forward edge of the enemy defenses and the first line were hit by the fire of guns assigned to fire by direct laying. With the approach of the infantry and tanks to a distance of 150-200 m from the first line, the artillery of the first artillery group shifted fire to targets on the third line. The artillery destroying targets on the second line increased the rate of fire and switched from barrage fire to intense shelling or bursts of rapid fire. With the approach of the enemy to a distance of 150-200 m from the second line, the second group which was firing at it began to neutralize targets using battery fire on the fourth line, while the artillery of the first group during this time increased the rate of fire and switched to hitting targets on the third line by intense shelling. Such a procedure of firing was maintained in shifting fire to the subsequent lines. Consequently, during the entire period of the artillery support for the attack, the artillery was firing simultaneously at targets on the two successive lines, forming a mobile zone of fire up to 800 m deep. The shifting of fire from line to line was carried out at designated times. The ratio of shell consumption for the lines was set approximately at 3:4:5. Such an allocation of ammunition was explained by the fact that the targets located on the first lines had been sufficiently neutralized during the artillery softening up for the attack. Moreover, with the increased range of fire accuracy declined and the effectiveness of fire was reduced.

An investigation of the methods employed during the war years for the artillery support of an attack shows that they were successfully used not only under daytime conditions but also in poor visibility and even at night. Instructive in this sense was the artillery support for the attack at night using the method of a double rolling barrage combined with a single rolling barrage and PSO in the 3d, 5th Shock, 8th Guards and 69th Armies of the First Belorussian Front in the Berlin Operation.

Thus, in line with the growing strength of enemy defenses, the saturating of them with weapons (including antitank), the need arose to increase the depth and reliability of hitting these defenses. This required an improvement in the existing methods of fire support for the infantry and tank attack as well as the use of new, more effective methods.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 6, 1976, p 48; "Sovetskaya artilleriya v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voynye 1941-1945 gg." [Soviet Artillery in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1960, p 165.
2. "Sbornik chislovykh kharkteristik artillieriyskogo voourzheniya byvshey germanskoy armii" [Collection of Numerical Characteristics of Artillery Weapons of the Former German Army], Moscow, Izd. GAU, 1947, p 4.

3. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 228, inv. 522, file 17, sheets 123-124.
4. Ibid., folio 233, inv. 2317, file 23, sheet 115.
5. G. Ye. Perekelskiy, A. I. Tokmakov and G. T. Khoroshilov, "Artilleriya v boyu i operatsii" [Artillery in Battle and an Operation], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1980, p 61.
6. TsAMO, folio 236, inv. 2700, file 28, sheets 120-121.
7. "Boevoy opyt artillerii v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyni" [The Combat Experience of the Artillery in the Great Patriotic War], Collection No 15, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1946, p 44.
8. TsAMO, folio 303, inv. 4023, file 76, sheet 74.
9. Ibid., sheets 14-15.

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REAR SUPPORT OF 14TH ARMY IN PETSAMO-KIRKENES OPERATION

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[Text] The combat operations of the 14th Army in the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation were conducted on an isolated maritime sector separated by a more than 100-km zone of impassable tundra from the other operational sectors of the Karelian Front. The army rear (chief of the rear, Maj Gen N. A. Shabanov) was deployed and operated in an impassable area of the Far North the territory of which was cut by numerous mountain rivers and streams and abounding in numerous large and small lakes interconnected by channels. The lack of roads and the virtually complete absence of population points greatly impeded the concentration and quartering of the troops as well as the activities of all rear bodies. The operation of the rear was also influenced by the fact that the rear units and facilities were located beyond Kola Bay while the army railheads and front dumps were on the eastern coast of the bay. Because of this all material supplies had to be unloaded from rail transport onto water and then from the water onto motor and cart. All of this created additional difficulties for the operation of the rear.

The basing of the army rear. During the period of preparing for the operation, the army was based (see the diagram) on the Kola--Murmansk section. In addition, the army used a waterway across the Barents Sea from Murmansk along the coast. Three spurs ran off the railroad line: Kola--Murmansk (13.5 km, Murmansk--Vayenga (32 km) and Olenya--Monchegorsk (off the diagram, 32 km). All the railroad sections were used for dispersing the material supplies and rear units arriving by rail. The headquarters of the field army base was located on Cape Mishukov.

It must be pointed out that over the entire operation the rail and water sections in the zone of the army were at the disposal of the front rear. It was responsible for delivering supplies for the army by rail transport. For the army a railhead had been established at Kola Station, and a navigation head in Kola Bay close to Cape Mishukov, and an unloading pier at Chan Ruchye. The front dumps or their departments were set up in the area of the army railhead and navigation head and the task of these was to store a portion of

the front supplies destined for supplying the army and ferrying the cargo across Kola Bay to Cape Michukov to the army dumps.




Diagram for the Organization of the Rear of the Karelian Front
in the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation

Key:

- 1--Position of sides on 7 October
- 2--Position of sides on 15 October
- 3--Position of sides on 29 October
- 4--Base points: c/c--railhead; n/c--navigation head;
b/n--unloading pier
- 5--Army military roads (AVAD)
- 6--Front military roads (FVAD)
- 7--Army dumps
- 8--Front dumps

In the course of the operation the materiel for the army troops began to be transported more and more by water. The formations and units received a larger portion of supply cargo from the navigation heads of Titovka Reka, Petsamo (Pechenga) and in the concluding stage Kirkenes, where departments of the field army dumps were successively set up.

Road support. The main roads of the front sector in the army zone of advance were: Mishukov--Bol. Zap. Litsa -- elev. 348 (56 km) -- Kola--Mishukov (19 km); Chan Ruchey -- elev. 313 (27 km). These roads were connected by two army lateral roads: No 1 running elev. 313 -- elev. 310 (21 km) and No 2 between Chan Ruchey and the northern shore of Lake Killyavr (19 km). The total length of the army roads with the accesses to the divisional dumps by the start of the operation was 158 km.

In the course of the offensive, the length of the army roads each day increased, and serious difficulties arose in road support for the troops, regardless of the fact that the front had additionally strengthened the army with 15 battalions of different type road troops. For improving troop road support, the Military Council of the Karelian Front on 15 October transferred the rear sections of the army roads No 1 and No 2 (up to the line of Petsamo, Luostari) to the road headquarters of the front and this was made responsible for equipping and maintaining these two front roads.(1) On the front and army military roads many sections of the roadway were widened to 5-6 m, a large number of laybys were built and additional mobile and permanent checkpoints were set up. Tow trucks or tractors patrolled constantly on the difficult sectors.

On the army roads the rear bodies set up maintenance, first aid and warming stations as well as kitchen-messes. As a total during the operation the service points fed 15,420 servicemen, issued 17,080 dry rations, provided medical aid to 1,220 sick and wounded and veterinary aid to 417 animals, disinfected 2,746 sets of clothing and repaired 338 motor vehicles.(2)

Logistical support and transport. The harsh natural and climatic conditions as well as the significant expanse of the operation demanded that the army rear establish ahead of time increased supplies of all material both in the troops and at the dumps. The basic portion of army supplies was concentrated in the troop rear area some 10-15 km away from the front line. With the poorly developed road network, the bringing of army supplies closer to the troops was an essential measure. The material supplies established by the start of the operation directly in the army as well as at the front dumps in the area of Kola--Murmanskr and designed especially for the supply of the army fully met the needs of the troops during the offensive operation.

In addition to establishing navigation heads in Ura-Guba, Titovka, Petsamo, the army rear in the course of the operation moved up head departments of the field army base with dump departments on the main military roads: when the troops reached the line of Linahamari--Luostari, in the area of Titovka; upon reaching the line Vuoremi--Nikel, in the area of Luostari, Petsamo; in the final stage of the operation, in the area of Nikel, Kirkenes. The head departments of the dumps were assigned first to the light rifle corps fighting on the army left flank. Here freight was delivered basically by animal transport directly to the battalions and companies.

The artillery supply service (chief of artillery supply, Col I. S. Sychev) at the beginning of September had begun delivering ammunition to the troops and concentrating this in the areas of the firing positions of the artillery and mortar units. By the start of the operation, the army had stockpiled the

following amounts of ammunition: for rifles 2.0 units of fire; for the 82-mm mortars 1.7, the 107-mm mortars 1.3 and the 120-mm mortars 3.0; regimental artillery 1.8, divisional artillery 1.6; for the 122-mm cannons and howitzers 1.7; for the 152-mm howitzer cannons 3.5 and for the 150-mm howitzers (captured) 1.8.(3) In the CXXXI and IC Rifle Corps which comprised the shock grouping of the army, increased supplies of ammunition were established: 3 units of fire for the 82-mm mortars, 2.2 for the regimental artillery and 1.7 for the divisional artillery. In addition, ammunition supplies (an average from 0.2 to 0.4 units of fire for each type) were kept at the army dumps.(4)

The supplies of motor vehicle fuel were 3,000 tons in the army (around five fuelings) and this exceeded the established rates by 1.5-fold. There was completely enough stored supplies for the troops. During the operation they consumed around 2,200 tons of fuel which was an average of two-three fuelings.(5)

Because of the commenced intense operational movements of troops on the Karelian Front from the south to the north and which tied up virtually all the rolling stock of the Kirov Railroad, the work of stockpiling supplies of food and fodder as well as the maneuvering of the food service facilities became significantly more complex. Because of this the front military council approved a decision to concentrate only 15 daily rations in the army out of the planned 30 day rations for the operation. The remaining 15 days were to be stored for the army at the front dumps. Of these 10 daily rations were at the railhead in the area of Kola Station at dumps No 383 and No 904 and 5 daily rations at the front dump No 2857 in the area of Belomorsk. Out of the total amount of supplies, up to 40 percent (12 daily rations) was kept in the form of dry rations. For example, this included: 16 daily rations of dry biscuit, 9 of concentrates, 19 of canned meats and 20 of suet. The caloric value of the daily ration, considering the conditions of the North, was high and was around 3,491 calories.

In the army formations, food supplies were established within the limits of 7 - 8 daily rations and for fed 14 daily rations. Some 5-7 days before the start of the operation, the personnel was issued 7 daily rations of dry rations.

Of enormous importance under Arctic conditions was the supplying of the troops with fuel, particularly the medical facilities and service points. By the start of the operation, the units and formations in the southern part of the Kola Peninsula had by their own forces prepared 64,500 m³ of firewood. In the course of the operation, fuel was prepared in the combat areas.(6)

For delivering materiel the army had three motor vehicle battalions (272d, 425th and 634th) with a total capacity of 870 tons as well as the 76th Separate Cart Transport Company (141 horses), and a detachment of reindeer sled teams (572 reindeer). In addition, the front assigned the army in August another four motor vehicle battalions with a total capacity of 890 tons. However, soon thereafter, at the start of October, three of these were taken away from the army, although previously they had handled shipments in the interests of the army.(7) Each of the light rifle corps from the reserve of

the front and the formations sent by the Murmansk Oblast Committee of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] received 500 reindeer each (including 400 for packs and 100 spare).

The transporting of cargo across Kola Bay and its delivery to the navigation heads on Cape Mishukov (see the diagram) were carried out by available local boats. For the crossing they used a barge and a lighter each carrying 250 tons.(8)

The sparse network of bad roads and at times the absence of lateral routes impeded the means of transport, particularly on the troop level. All transport in the battalion, regimental and at times even the brigade rear was provided by pack animal transport and sometimes by teams of bearers. Thus, in the 10th Guards Division at the end of September, five rifle battalions for 14 nights running carried ammunition in special crating to the positions.

Air transport was used along with motor transport which delivered the army 61 percent of all the materiel as well as maritime transport which transported around 70,000 tons of various cargo from Murmansk to the navigation heads of Ura-Guba, Titovka, Petsamo. Rail transport was used slightly for intra-army shipments on the sections Kola--Murmashi and Kola--Monchegorsk. Thus, from September through October 1944, the army rear services unloaded 21,518 railroad cars and loaded just 1,254 cars.(9)

The amount of army motor transport work during the preparations for and in the course of the operation is shown in the Table.(10) An analysis of it indicates that ammunition and food were the basic types of supplies transported by motor transport. These comprised 92 percent of all the transported freight.

By the start of the operation, the hospital facilities of the army (their capacity was 6,000-7,500 beds) and other medical facilities had been deployed to the north of Cape Mishukov. Surgical hospitals of the first line and a portion of the medical transport had been moved up to the boundary of the troop rear. When the troops reached the line of Petsamo, Luostari the plans were to shift the hospital facilities to the area of Titovka, Bol. Zap. Litsa.

In organizing medical support, consideration was given to the physicogeographic and climatic conditions of the Arctic. For carrying and evacuating wounded from the battlefield, extensive use was made of dogs which pulled travois, flat-bottomed boats and stretchers. Where the terrain permitted the wounded were transported on reindeer and horses.

The evacuation of sick and wounded from the medical subunits of the troop rear to the army medical facilities was carried out chiefly by motor transport, both ambulances as well as transport returning to the rear after delivering materiel to the troops. Air, water and cart transport was also employed. Aircraft along evacuated around 1,000 sick and wounded.

Patients with acute gastrointestinal and illnesses and colds comprised the major portion of sick. Most such patients were in units and formations which

had not previously fought under Arctic conditions. Such patients comprised up to 50-60 percent of the total number of medical losses.

Table

Amount of Work Carried Out by Army Motor Transport

Types of transported materiel	in preparatory period		in course of operation		Total	
	ton	ton-km	ton	ton-km	ton	ton-km
a) Transport						
Ammunition	8,879	232,394	4,083	380,151	12,962	612,545
Food	8,123	228,136	5,891	315,711	14,014	543,847
Fuel	48	1,160	88	3,416	136	4,576
Other types of freight	1,045	36,526	1,013	60,415	2,058	96,941
Total:	18,095	498,216	11,075	759,693	29,170	1,257,909
b) Evacuation						
Weapons and equipment	--	--	38	2,932	38	2,932
Special crating	1,764	26,941	1,054	8,443	2,818	35,384
Various freight	639	9,895	625	44,896	1,265	54,791
Total:	2,403	36,836	1,718	56,271	4,121	93,107

Veterinary support. The army had a significant number of animals including horses, reindeer and dogs. These were used for delivering materiel to the units and subunits and for locating and evacuating wounded. Certain artillery and mortar units and subunits according to the TOE had horse-drawn traction. The presence of animals in the units and formations required that the veterinary service precisely carry out large-scale and diverse preventive and antiepidemic measures. In the formations they regularly carried out strict control over the movement of the horses and reindeer and there were regular examinations, treatments and inoculations for the horses, reindeer and dogs. In all the formations and in the army rear veterinary treatment and evacuation facilities were set up.

The experience gained in the course of the operation for operational and troop rear services showed that the successful carrying out of the tasks set for troop logistical support under the conditions of the Far North is achieved primarily by the early and careful preparation of the rear units and facilities and by a knowledge and consideration of the natural and climatic features of the combat area.

With the advancing of the troops on a maritime sector in terrain extremely limited in land communications, the role of maritime transport rose constantly in delivering materiel to the troops.

The transfer of the rear sections of the army military roads to the road headquarters of the front made it possible for the army to focus basic efforts of the road troops on equipping and improving sections of military roads on liberated territory. As a result, the state of the roads in the zone of advance was noticeably improved.

FOOTNOTES

1. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 214, inv. 210929, file 6, sheets 14-41.
2. Ibid., folio 363, inv. 6239, file 205, sheets 94-137.
3. Ibid., inv. 6208, file 253, sheet 5.
4. Ibid., inv. 6239, file 205, sheets 95-140.
5. Ibid., folio 214, inv. 194889, file 6, sheets 73-80; folio 363, inv. 6208, file 260, sheets 21-35.
6. Ibid., file 253, sheet 7.
7. Ibid., folio 214, inv. 434237, file 2, sheets 224-240.
8. Ibid., folio 363, inv. 6208, file 253, sheets 2, 3.
9. Ibid., file 260, sheet 40.
10. Ibid., inv. 6239, file 205, sheets 85-90.

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